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"An American has no sense of privacy. He does not know what
it means. There is no such thing in the country." George
Bernard Shaw, Speech at New York (April 11, 1933).1
"I might have been a goldfish in a glass bowl for all the privacy I
got." SAKI (Hector Hugh Munro), The Innocence of Reginald, in
Reginald (1904).2
"Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The sav-
age's whole existence is public, ruled by the laws of his tribe.
Civilization is the process of setting man free from men."
AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1943).
3
Introduction
Somebody may have photographed or videotaped you today without
your knowledge or consent. If you used a credit card or grocery store "bonus
card," an electronic record now exists of what you bought and where you
bought it; someday someone might retrieve that information and use it
against you. Someone from a remote location may be reading the financial
and other personal data you keep on your home computer's hard drive or
may be using your computer to send spain without your knowledge. As you
skim this paragraph deciding whether to keep reading, your employer might
be doing the same thing to any e-mail you sent from or received at the office.
A friend may be posting on the Web, for the perusal of anyone who is curi-
ous, what you said or did in what you thought was a private moment. If you
insulted, crossed, or disappointed someone, or someone thinks you have
done so, he or she probably can humiliate, embarrass, and inconvenience you
to an extent that, except for those who have experienced it, none of us can
truly imagine. Indeed, someone you never heard of might be preparing to do
so; and if that happened and you are even indirectly involved in public mat-
ters, there is a pretty good chance the mass media would jump in with both
feet.
The papers presented at this Symposium focus primarily on the difficul-
ties in reconciling our demand that the government protect us from terrorists
and criminals and our insistence that the government respect our right to
privacy. Striking this balance is particularly challenging in light of the tech-
nological and social revolution we call the Internet, the outrages perpetrated
on September 11, 2001, and the Uniting and Strengthening America by Pro-
viding Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
("USA PATRIOT Act") 4 enacted the following month. These are important
issues. But the likelihood that the government will in fact use USA PA-
1 JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 571 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed.
1992).
2 Id. at 610.
3 Id. at 717. That I quote these authors should not be taken to suggest that I align myself
with their politics. (Only a schizophrenic could align himself with Rand and Shaw at the same
time.)
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
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TRIOT Act provisions or the Internet to intrude on your privacy is, really,
quite low. The risk, for the overwhelming majority of Americans, is theoreti-
cal, not real.
On the other hand, the intrusions into privacy outlined in the first para-
graph of this Article are very real, and, while very few of us will suffer the
worst of them, the odds are that each of us submits to some of these intru-
sions, none of which come from the government, just about every day.
This Article reviews how the Internet and related developments-tech-
nological, social, and legal-have magnified the threat to privacy posed by
private individuals, commercial enterprises, and the media. It offers a brief
overview of the current threats to privacy from sources other than the gov-
ernment, and, in particular, the impact of the Internet in creating or magnify-
ing those threats. Part I discusses the threat to privacy in general, examining
how the Internet and developments in surveillance technology, in informa-
tion storage and retrieval, in dissemination of information, sound, and
images, and changes to the informal "social contract" that defines general
standards have all endangered privacy as we know it. Part II examines the
advantages these developments give to individual betrayers, grudgers,5 and
snoops, who seek to undermine the privacy of particular individuals, and to
spammers, who do the same on a much broader scale. Part III reviews the
ways in which corporate information gathering intrudes on privacy. Part IV
looks at the role the media has played in exploiting and encouraging privacy-
threatening developments. The Article ends with a not-particularly-cheerful
prognosis.
L The Threat to Privacy: In General
In considering where we are, it is useful to recall how we got here.
Respect for individual privacy has been a deeply held value throughout
the history of Western civilization. We can find an early codification of the
principle in Deuteronomy 24:10-11: "When you make a loan of any sort to
your countryman, you must not enter his house to seize his pledge. You must
remain outside, while the man to whom you made the loan brings the pledge
out to you."' 6 Some 3,000 or more years ago, at a time when "government" as
we know it today did not exist, the Torah7 mandated that the rich and power-
ful must respect the dignity and the privacy of the poor and vulnerable. 8
272; see Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1145 (2004).
5 I have coined the word "grudgers" to mean "people who have a grudge."
6 Deuteronomy 24:10-11. Biblical translations are from JEWISH PUBL'N Soc'y, TANAKH:
A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL HEBREW
TEXT (1985). The discussion in this paragraph is taken from Clifford S. Fishman, Old Testament
Justice, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 405 (2002), in which I sought to show that many of the fundamental
principles underlying contemporary criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence may be
found in the Torah.
7 "Torah" is a Hebrew word meaning "teaching"; it is also the word used to describe the
first five books of the Bible. It is in the latter sense that I use it here.
8 See, e.g., Exodus 22:24-26.
[241 If you lend money to My people, to the poor among you, do not act toward
them as a creditor: exact no interest from them. [25] If you take your neighbor's
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Although privacy has long been a deeply cherished value, it competes
with powerful countervailing pressures and tendencies. First, respect for pri-
vacy cannot be so absolute that society is unable to intervene to prevent con-
duct harmful to others. Second, there is in most of us the desire to know that
which is hidden; we like to be in on secrets. Third, many of us have a power-
ful urge to share such knowledge with others. (The combination of these lat-
ter two tendencies explains why gossip has always been among the most
popular vices.) Fourth, there is also in some people the urge to share with
the public at large information about themselves which most of us would
consider private. 9 This "exhibitionist principle" threatens privacy to the ex-
tent that it alters public standards of what is acceptable and expected. Fifth,
information has always had value: someone who knows a great deal about
others can use that information to enhance his or her own standing, whether
financial, social, or political.
As a practical matter, the protection of individual privacy has depended
on several factors. The law played its part, but it was far from the most im-
portant. Rather, a number of practical limitations combined to protect pri-
vacy against those who snooped to satisfy curiosity or for personal gain.
Among the most important were the limitations of technology, difficulties in
storing and retrieving information, limited means of disseminating informa-
tion, and the existence of an informal but powerful "social contract" that
dictated that certain topics were off-limits to public discourse.
A. Technology
Until a century or so ago, snooping was often difficult. The would-be
snoop could not see behind closed doors or hear over more than a short
distance. And if the snoop did see or hear something intended to remain
private, he could tell others about it, but he could not reproduce it for others
to see or hear in turn. This afforded a degree of privacy even with regard to
conduct in public places.
Today, of course, surveillance technology is inexpensive and ubiquitous.
The ease with which a snoop can use microphones, transmitters, electronic
garment in pledge, you must return it to him before the sun sets; [26] it is his only
clothing, the sole covering for his skin. In what else shall he sleep? Therefore, if he
cries out to Me, I will pay heed, for I am compassionate.
Id.
The rabbis of the Talmudic era derived further support for the right to privacy from the
story of Balaam. Balak, the king of Moab, bribes Balaam, a local prophet, to curse the Israelites;
but when Balaam looks out over the Israelite encampment, God has him say, "How fair are your
tents, 0 Jacob, Your dwellings, 0 Israel!" Numbers 24:5.
A rabbinic gloss on this verse explains that Balaam was praising the Israelites' encampment
because, out of respect for privacy, they had positioned their tents so that the entrance of no
one's tent faced the entrance of another. Talmud Bavli, Bava Batra 60a. And while this rabbinic
gloss on the verse was not intended to be a statement of historical fact-the rabbis of the Talmud
could not possibly know how their ancient ancestors positioned their tents-it does show how
deeply respect for privacy is embedded in Jewish law. The Torah and Talmud are not unique in
this respect; similar passages, instructions, and lessons extolling and protecting personal privacy
can be found in the works of most other cultures and societies.
9 See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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receivers, key loggers, and the like to eavesdrop on verbal and written com-
munications and hack into private files and data is discussed in a subsequent
section of this Article. 10 Permanently mounted video cameras in public
places-banks, building lobbies and hallways, elevators, and, recently, street
corners and public squares"-are so common that we hardly notice them.
While many of these have a legitimate and limited purpose, such as cameras
at toll booths to assure that tolls are paid, the information recorded by them
is susceptible to other uses or misuses.12
The individual videocam enthusiast is also ubiquitous, and recent ad-
vances in miniaturization and digitization will make it much easier to photo-
graph 13 or videotape' 4 others without being noticed. Some of these cameras
can "see" even in the dark.' 5 Every once in a while one will capture an im-
portant event, the beating of Rodney King, for example. Far more often,
however, what gets taped is a man hoping not to be noticed as he tugs at his
seat or crotch to undo a wedgie, or a woman unaware that her skirt is riding
up in back. If they are lucky, neither will learn that the moment has been
10 See infra Part II.
11 See, e.g., GAO, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: INFOR-
MATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT'S USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO MONITOR SELECTED
FEDERAL PROPERTY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2003); Welling Savo, They're Watching You, Bos-
TON MAG., Sept. 2003, at 120, 122 (relating that various traffic and highway authorities in Massa-
chusetts have or soon will have 1232 cameras monitoring state roads, airports, and subway and
commuter rail facilities; and noting that there are "at least 128 surveillance cameras in Boston's
tightly packed Financial District," and probably many times that, mostly on private property).
12 See Savo, supra note 11, at 173 (reporting that, in 2002, prosecutors subpoenaed photo-
graphs automatically taken at a particular turnpike exit's Fast Lane on the night and in the
vicinity that a murder was committed; despite the fact that the turnpike authority promised Fast
Lane subscribers that the photographs would be used only for turnpike purposes, a judge upheld
the subpoena, concluding, quite reasonably, that it would be absurd to permit a turnpike
agency's privacy policies to trump a murder investigation).
13 Digital cameras in cell phones present particularly acute issues. See, e.g., Simon J.
Nadel, In a Flash, Cell Phones with Cameras Can Develop into Major Employer Concern, 72
U.S.L.W. 2307 (2003) (relating worries that an employee could use a cell phone camera to pho-
tograph trade secrets and post them immediately on the Internet, too quickly for the victim to
obtain an injunction, or to photograph coworkers and supervisors in unflattering settings or con-
texts); Kamahria Hopkins, Cameras Are More Candid at Gyms: Health Clubs Are on Guard for
Cell Phone Pictures Snapped in the Locker Room, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Nov. 12, 2003, at 1;
John Keilman, Gym Users Back Ban on Cell Phones, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 2003, § 1, at 18.
14 On November 6, 2003, the New York Times reported that Panasonic and Gateway are
now marketing completely digitized camcorders that are roughly the size of a bar of soap. One
offers excellent visual quality but can be used for only ten minutes before the images have to be
offloaded or recorded over; the other lacks a zoom lens and the images it produces are of much
poorer quality. But as the article's author points out, "[Tihese first incarnations make it clear
that the concept can work.... [Y]ou can stuff a camcorder in your pocket along with your keys,
and videos can be as convenient to capture as stills." David Pogue, Camcorders with Tape? How
Quaint, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at G1. And on November 21, 2003, the New York Times
reported on experiments that may someday lead to the development of "molecular-sized circuits,
the smallest possible." Kenneth Chang, Smaller Computer Chips Built Using DNA as Template,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at A22. Israeli scientists are using "strands of DNA, the computer
code of life, to create tiny transistors that can literally build themselves." Id.
15 See, e.g., Robert Irwin, What's New in Camcorders, CAMCORDER & COMPUTER VIDEO,
Nov. 2003, at 26, 26 (describing the features of camcorders now on the market, many of which
include "the ability to 'see' in total darkness").
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recorded. If they are unlucky, they will appear on Funniest Home Videos or
the like.
Even though the law says that conduct a person knowingly exposes to
the public is not legally protected, 16 as a practical matter, until recently we
still enjoyed substantial privacy even in public because it was unlikely anyone
would see or notice what we did; and even if someone did see and notice, the
witness had no hard proof. That once-comfortable assumption is no longer
one on which we can rely.
Moreover, public electronic visual surveillance may soon be enhanced
by biometrics-the ability of machines to read our physical features and
identify us from those features. To date, biometric technology has proven
useful in controlled situations. 17 Finger scan, 18 hand geometry, 19 retina
scan,20 iris scan, 21 and voice recognition technology22 have proven useful in
confirming the identities of employees, welfare recipients,23 and persons with
access to secured areas and may soon be employed as an immigration control
measure. 24 Each of these current or proposed uses of such technology ap-
pears to be justified by the benefits that the government agency or private
employer derives from use of the technology. These legitimate uses never-
theless make inroads into privacy by affirming identities and making a relia-
ble and easily retrieved record of who-was-where-when. The tendency for
employers and others to collect and store data simply because they can may
prompt them to require or encourage submission to such technology under
16 "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Nor is there usually a civil remedy; courts generally require a substantial showing of malice
before photographing or videotaping public conduct is actionable. Christopher Slobogin, Public
Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 272
(2002). Furthermore, only one state has any statutory regulation of such surveillance. Id. at 235.
17 Robyn Moo-Young, Note, "Eyeing" the Future: Surviving the Criticisms of Biometric
Authentication, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 421-22 (2001).
18 SALIL PRABHAKAR, INT'L BIOMETIC GROUP, FINGERPRINT MATCHING, at http://biomet-
rics.cse.msu.edu/fingerprint.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
19 Shaila K. Dewan, Elementary, Watson: Scan a Palm, Find a Clue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2003, at Al (reporting an increased use of palm print databases by law enforcement officials);
INT'L BIOMETRIC GROUP, HAND SCAN PROJECTS AND APPLICATIONS (on file with The George
Washington Law Review).
20 INT'L BIOMETRIC GROUP, RETINA SCAN TECHNOLOGY (on file with The George Wash-
ington Law Review).
21 INT'L BIOMETRIC GROUP, IRIS RECOGNITION: THE TECHNOLOGY (on file with The
George Washington Law Review).
22 See Moo-Young, supra note 17, at 435.
23 James J. Killerlane, III, Note, Finger Imaging: A 21st Century Solution to Welfare Fraud
at Our Fingertips, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1327, 1329-30 (1995).
24 See Jennifer B. Lee, The Art and Craft of Security: Passports and Visas to Add High- Tech
Identity Features, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at A26; Anitha Reddy, U.S. Readies Program to
Track Visas, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2003, at El (reporting a new program, expected to cost
between $3 billion and $10 billion, to photograph and finger-scan visa applicants in their home
country and check their identities against databases of suspected terrorists); see also Philip She-
non, New Passport Rules to Fight Terrorism Are Put Off for a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at
A20.
1508 [Vol. 72:1503
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circumstances where the benefits to society do not compensate for the dimi-
nution of individual privacy.
25
The threat to privacy in public is likely to increase considerably in the
near future. Three years ago, articles appeared in the press that Tampa po-
lice would use facial recognition technology at Super Bowl XXXV.2 6 Cam-
eras would scan the facial geometry of people in the crowd and compare each
face to those stored in a database. 27 Despite the publicity, the actual intru-
sion into privacy appeared to be minor; no record was kept of faces that were
scanned, and after more than two years of use, the program was dropped
without a single successful identification or arrest attributed to it.28 If such
technology is perfected, however, its impact on personal privacy would be
substantial, particularly if it becomes available to private industry and private
individuals.
Nor can we assume that we are surveillance-free even in an office, home,
or other private place. Sophisticated video cameras can now be hidden in
light fixtures, stuffed animals, or even in pinholes in walls. Worse still, the
law offers little protection or solace to those whose privacy is violated by
such surveillance.
29
B. Information Storage and Retrieval
Imagine it is 1970. Person X has been targeted for surveillance. Each
individual with whom person X interacts learns something about him-the
food he buys, the books he reads, how often he is late to work or takes a day
of sick leave, whether he is a generous or stingy tipper in restaurants. Re-
cording and storing such information, however, is laborious. It may be diffi-
cult and time-consuming for an investigator to develop a reasonably
comprehensive list of those with whom person X interacts.30 Moreover, even
25 The otherwise forgettable movie Minority Report includes a vivid scene in which Tom
Cruise's character is walking through a mall. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox &
Dreamworks 2002). Each billboard he passes reads his retinas and addresses him by name as it
tries to sell him a product or service. Id.
26 See, e.g., Peter Slevin, Police Video Cameras Taped Football Fans: Super Bowl Surveil-
lance Stirs Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al; see generally JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR.,
RAND ARROYO CTR., SUPER BOWL SURVEILLANCE: FACING UP TO BIOMETRICS (2001).
27 INT'L BIOMETRIC GROUP, FACIAL SCAN TECHNOLOGY: How IT WORKS, at http://
www.facial-scan.com/facial-scantechnology.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
28 Audrey Hudson, Tampa Cops End Camera Program: High-Tech System Produced No
Hits, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at Al.
29 It is worth comparing the law governing video surveillance with that governing surveil-
lance of communications. An elaborate federal statutory structure exists regulating government
surveillance of communications and protecting them from unauthorized private surveillance.
See generally CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
(2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2004). For a concise overview, see Patricia Bellia, Surveillance Law
Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375 (2004). By contrast, no federal statute
generally regulates video surveillance. Thus, to install a camera which does not capture conver-
sations requires only a search warrant, rather than a much more demanding communications
interception order. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra, § 29:20(b). Nor does the use of such a
camera by a private party violate federal or most state laws governing electronic surveillance.
Id. § 2:41(h).
30 The degree of difficulty would vary, of course, depending on whether the target of the
surveillance lived in a small town, a suburb, or a large city.
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assuming those whom the investigator contacts are willing to share their in-
formation about person X, they might not be able to remember it. In sum,
the fact that such information about person X is scattered about and haphaz-
ardly kept and maintained constitutes a substantial practical defense of per-
son X's privacy.
Consider a similar investigation today. Computers gather, store, and of-
fer instant retrieval of huge quantities of information about us. A great deal
of information about most people is lawfully available online. 31 Someone
who gains access to our credit card bills instantly knows where we shop,
where we eat, and a lot about what we do for recreation. Using a supermar-
ket or pharmacy "customer bonus card" permits the store to keep a detailed
record of every purchase we make.32 Every e-mail we send or receive and
every click of the mouse while we surf the Web is electronically stored and is,
therefore, potentially available to a hacker.
At present, so far as we know, there is no central depository where all of
this information is kept. Although a government agency recently proposed
assembling such a database, the proposal was quickly rejected by Congress.
33
Still, controllers of these databases are restrained only by promises not to
reveal the information and fear of adverse publicity if they do share it. Even
if each compiler of information steadfastly refuses to share the information
with others, the information may be legally accessible to anyone with a super-
ficially plausible reason to subpoena it.34
31 See John Schwartz & Jonathan Glater, L.A. Confidential: In Land of Big-Budget Egos,
Private Investigators Are a Part of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at C1.
The tool kit for private investigators has expanded with the growth of the Internet and the
assembly of online databases of personal information. Data that might once have been inacces-
sible, or illegal to obtain, can be found "if you intelligently search and mine what is available
through the Internet and some of the other online sources," said a retired F.B.I. agent who now
runs a private investigation agency in New York City. Id. Previously, "you used the gumshoe
techniques" before trying any fancy technology. Id. Now, he said, the best investigators start
their queries at their desks, online. Id.
32 See infra Part III.C.
33 In 2003, information emerged that the Defense Department's Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency ("DARPA") was working on software that could search the computer-
ized travel, credit, medical, and other records of individuals for information that might reveal
preparations for acts of terrorism. Carl Hulse, Congress Shuts Pentagon Unit over Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A20. The project was originally designated the "Total Information
Awareness Program," a title that pretty much guaranteed skepticism across the political spec-
trum. See id. Congressional concern about the program was heightened by the fact that the
DARPA director responsible for development of the program was retired Admiral John M.
Poindexter, who had been significantly involved in the Iran-Contra scandal and who had been
accused of lying to Congress. Id.; see David Corn, Iran/Contra Rehab, NATION, Mar. 11, 2002, at
4. A change of name to "Terrorist Information Awareness Program" was insufficient to save the
program; Poindexter resigned and the Office of Information Awareness was defunded by Con-
gress. Hulse, supra; Michael Sniffen, High-Tech Spying Program Closed; Lawmakers Rule Office
Too Invasive, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 2003, at 11.
34 See generally Catherine Crump, Note, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and Ac-
countability Online, 56 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2003).
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C. Dissemination
Until recently, it was usually difficult to disseminate information about
another. Gossip, as we all know, can spread with distressing speed, but the
means to disseminate information beyond a fairly small community were lim-
ited. If the mass media (newspapers, magazines, radio, and television) de-
clined to publish or broadcast the information, someone hoping to
disseminate it was out of luck.
35
Today, the Internet has obliterated those restraints. The betrayer or
grudger can disseminate even the most private information about individuals
at will; and if the information tickles the public fancy, information about pri-
vate people can become world "news" within days. 36
D. The "Social Contract"
An informal understanding, or "social contract," has long existed to re-
spect privacy. Its enforcement was far from uniform, but a general under-
standing existed that certain information was "private," even with regard to
public figures. Interestingly, breaches of this understanding played a signifi-
cant role in the formation of the United States37 and had an impact on early
35 I am not advocating media monopolies. I merely point out that when relatively few
individuals or companies control the mass media in a particular community, they can, if they
choose, prevent the dissemination of information about the private lives of others.
36 For an example, see infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
37 In the late 1760s and early 1770s, Benjamin Franklin served as the London agent of
Massachusetts and several other American colonies, seeking to negotiate on their behalf with
various branches of the British government. THOMAS FLEMING, THE MAN WHO DARED THE
LIGHTNING: A NEW LOOK AT BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 259 (1971). At some point Franklin came
into possession of letters written by the Royal Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Massachu-
setts to the government in London during the 1768-69 riots in Boston over the Townshend du-
ties. Id. at 225. These letters grossly misrepresented the situation and urged the British
government to send troops to cow the colony into submission. Id. Franklin forwarded these
letters to his associates in Massachusetts. Id. The letters were ultimately published in a Boston
newspaper, and this became such a scandal in London that a duel was fought when one person
falsely accused another of being the source. Id. at 237-38. At that point, to foreclose further
bloodshed, Franklin, in London, acknowledged that he was the person who had sent the letters
to Massachusetts. Id. at 239. Franklin's enemies in the British government summoned him to
appear before the Privy Counsel on January 29, 1774, where, for almost an hour, the Crown
Solicitor General, Alexander Wedderburn, attacked him. Id. at 245-49. Wedderburn remarked:
Private correspondence has hitherto been held sacred in times of the greatest party
rage, not only in politics but religion. He [Franklin] has forfeited all the respect of
societies and of men. Into what companies will he hereafter go with an unembar-
rassed face, or the honest intrepidity of virtue? Men will watch him with a jealous
eye; they will hide their papers from him, and lock up their escritoires.
Id. at 247. Fleming notes the blatant hypocrisy of Wedderburn's attack; as Wedderburn un-
doubtedly knew, the British government had been intercepting and reading Franklin's corre-
spondence for years. Id. at 247. The British government did not, however, publish the
correspondence to the world at large. See id. This experience convinced Franklin that reconcili-
ation between Britain and the colonies was impossible. Id. at 249-51. Indeed, after the formal
meeting broke up, Franklin whispered to Wedderburn, "I will make your master a little king for
this." Id. at 250. A few months later Franklin returned to Philadelphia, where he became a
leading exponent of independence at the Continental Congress. Id. at 288-91. (There is a
charming coda to this story. Franklin put away the clothing he wore that day and did not wear
them again until the day he signed the treaty that ended the Revolutionary War and recognized
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twentieth century diplomatic history, as well.38 This informal understanding
explains why the media rarely referred to Franklin Roosevelt's physical infir-
mities during his presidency and why the media never ran photographs of the
president being helped or carried. 39 Similarly, the media never reported on
President Kennedy's extramarital dalliances, even though many members of
the media were aware of them.
40
That social contract no longer exists; it certainly has been abolished from
the popular culture. Consider: (a) the self-absorption of many in the per-
forming arts, their (unfortunately accurate) assumption that many people
want to know about their struggles with alcohol, drugs, unsupportive parents,
promiscuity, or the difficulty of living with fame and adulation, and the ea-
gerness of the media to publish or broadcast the performer's self-revelatory
ramblings; (b) the belief among many would-be artists and their groupies
that virtually any behavior should be permitted, so long as it assists the artist
in "saying something";41 (c) the self-revealing confessions of "guests" on the
Jerry Springer Show and the like; (d) the eagerness with which contestants on
various reality shows share with the camera what would be their most inti-
mate moments and what would be their deepest thoughts; (e) the prolifera-
tion of blogs,42 where people reveal to anyone who logs on intimate thoughts
the United States of America as an independent nation. CARL VAN DOREN, BENJAMIN FRANK-
LIN 478 (1941)).
38 Perhaps the most extreme and misguided example of this general understanding oc-
curred in 1929 when Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson closed the Department of State's code-
breaking service, the so-called "Black Chamber," because, as Stimson explained, "Gentlemen do
not read each other's mail." DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS: THE STORY OF SECRET WRIT-
ING 360 (1967); HENRY L. STIMSON & McGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND
WAR 188 (1948).
39 ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY: ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 48-49 (1998) (reporting the existence of this informal understanding). "If this rule was
violated, members of the Secret Service were not averse to seizing the camera of the offending
party and exposing the film." Id. at 49; see also HUGH E. EVANS, THE HIDDEN CAMPAIGN:
FDR's HEALTH AND THE 1944 ELECTION 33 (2002).
40 Timothy Kelly, Politics Gets Personal, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Oct. 4, 1999, at 8.
41 See, e.g., Daniel J. Wakin, Keep the Sex R-Rated, N. Y. U. Tells Film Students, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2003, at B1. A film student at New York University, seeking to "compare the normal
behavior of people in their everyday lives versus the animalistic behavior that comes out when
they are having sex" (a phenomenon with which most people are already quite familiar),
planned to film two volunteers having intercourse in class and, thus, produce a four-minute film
which would intersperse "30-second clips of passionate sex with scenes of the couple engaged in
more mundane activities, like watching television and reading a newspaper." Id. The instructor
approved enthusiastically, but then, in a moment of passing good judgment, bounced the idea off
University officials. Id. The officials politely but firmly said "no" and insisted that student film
projects adhere to the Motion Picture Association Guidelines, going no further than an "R"
rating would permit. Id. (It will, I am sure, surprise no one that the student newspaper and a
spokesman for the American Civil Liberties Union expressed dismay and despair that the Uni-
versity would so cruelly stifle student creativity. Id.)
42 A "blog," also called a Web log, is "a type of online, hosted chatroom usually devoted to
a specific subject the host wants to discuss.... [B]loggers are often passionate, if not fanatical,
about the subjects they cover." NEwTON's TELECOM DICTIONARY 115 (19th ed. 2003). Many
blogs have specialized professional uses. See, e.g., William O'Shea, New Economy: The Online
Journals Known as Web Logs Are Finding Favor as an Efficient Way to Communicate Within the
Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2003, at C3.
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that once were revealed only on the pages of a private diary;43 (f) the phe-
nomenon of people who, not content merely to narrate their thoughts and
experiences to the world at large, live their lives in front of Web cams for
anyone who logs on to their Web site to see;44 (g) and the emerging industry
of charging customers to log on and watch physically attractive young people
who are paid to live in a camera-saturated environment. 45 This list is not
43 See, e.g., Warren St. John, Dating a Blogger, Reading All About It, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2003, § 9, at 1. St. John relates incidents in which bloggers criticized the church to which their
parents belonged, insulted close friends, discussed their sex lives with their boyfriends, or offered
negative comments about coworkers, and the frequently negative impact that doing so has had
on the bloggers' lives, careers, and relationships. Id. The article quotes several interviewees
(many of whom are also bloggers): "It's like all your friends are reporters now," "the confes-
sional nature of many blogs had 'redrawn the line between what's private and public,"' and that
dating a blogger "was an odd feeling that there was a camera on me," particularly because
friends and relatives followed the blogger's description of the relationship on line. Id. St. John
comments: "With so many self-publishing reporters out there, some say they feel a need to watch
themselves, for fear that casual comments made to friends might make tomorrow morning's
entry." Id.
The phenomenon is now international. See John Pomfret, A New Gloss on Freedom: Sexual
Revolution Sweeps China's Youth, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2003, at All; see also Michael Snider,
The Intimacy of Blogs, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 15, 2003, at 40 (estimating in a Canadian news weekly
that there are up to two million blogs on the Internet).
44 The first well known instance was the "JenniCam"; twenty-year-old Jennifer Ringley set
up a fish-eye camera in her apartment, linked it to the Web, and lived her life in front of it.
Jennifer Tanaka, The Whole World Is Watching, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 74. By 1999, the
site received 4.5 million hits a day and hundreds of e-mails, many of which were complaints
when she left her apartment. Id. at 75. "'People yell at me if I'm not home enough,' she says.
'When I spend the night at my boyfriend's I get e-mail the next morning telling me how dare I be
gone.' The solution? She installed a Web cam at his place." Id. As of January 2004, however,
JenniCam is scheduled to meet the fate that comes eventually to all small-screen entertainment,
however popular; it will be disconnected. Web Watch: Final Days in the Life at Jennicam, WASH.
POST, Dec. 7, 2003, at F7 (quoting one viewer who rued the end of what he called "a sociological
experiment and a life-narrative art project"). PayPal, the company through which she collected
the annual subscriber fees, announced that it will close her account at the end of the year be-
cause from time to time Ringley appeared before the camera naked, and PayPal's policy prohib-
its "the sale of items for mature audiences." Id. A more cynical non-observer might comment
hopefully that PayPal's admirable action could have the worthwhile side-effect of prompting
Jennie's viewers to get lives of their own.
Still, devotees of the phenomenon need not despair. See Julie Szego, Camgirls, THE AGE
(Melbourne), Feb. 1, 2003, Saturday Extra, at 1 (describing similar individual Web sites and
discussing the potential negative effects on both the viewed and the viewer). As an alternative,
someone addicted to vicarious living has options such as WebDorm.com, "where you can watch
real-life college students eat, sleep and study in their natural habitat 24 hours a day, seven days a
week." Tanaka, supra, at 75. (Query: does living in front of a camera increase the likelihood
that college students will clean their rooms?)
45 Guessing correctly that people would pay to watch such a thing, two enterprising
pornographers bought a five-bedroom house in a residential neighborhood in Tampa, Florida,
placed cameras everywhere (including the showers), and recruited "young, sexy college girls" to
live in it. Francesca Ortiz, Zoning the Voyeur Dorm: Regulating Home-Based Voyeur Websites
Through Land Use Laws, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 929, 933 (2001). In "Voyeur Dorm" ("VD"),
the women live rent and board free, and their college tuition is paid; in exchange they are en-
couraged (among other things) to sunbathe nude, shower frequently, have "lingerie parties,"
strip when asked to do so by subscribers to the special chatline, and entertain their boyfriends.
Id. at 934. (Although the house has a "no sex on camera" policy, the residents apparently from
time to time forget this in the heat of passion. Id.) In addition to room, board, and tuition, each
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exhaustive. It is tempting to dismiss each of these as unimportant anomalies
at the fringes of society, but as such instances multiply, so does the risk that
many people will assume they have the "right" to similar information about
anyone, including those who wish to keep private matters private.
The social contract no longer exists in advertising either, where, for ex-
ample, the phrase "erectile dysfunction" may be aired more often than "the
quicker picker-upper." Other examples abound.
46
Even the government plays a part. Information is now available online
that was once public in name only and was truly accessible only to those who
trooped down to the courthouse or municipal building. Sometimes disclosure
of such information has a legitimate public purpose, despite the intrusion into
privacy. An example is the posting on the Internet of information about con-
victed and released sexual predators. Other times, however, posting informa-
tion online serves no purpose other than to feed the public's appetite for
scandal or titillation, sometimes at the expense of the obscure,47 and
resident receives a weekly stipend, the amount depending on the frequency and enthusiasm with
which she participates in such activities. Id. When the venture proved to be a financial success,
the same entrepreneurs, demonstrating that they are equal-opportunity panderers, also started a
similar dorm occupied solely by men. Id.; see also Jennifer Berry, Dorm Web Cameras Rise in
Use, VISTA (Univ. of San Diego), Mar. 13, 2002, at 1 (reporting that VD grosses $200,000 a
month). An Eleventh Circuit decision described in the next paragraph noted that from August
1998 to June 2000, VD generated subscriptions and sales exceeding $3.1 million. Voyeur Dorm
v. City of Tampa, 265 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2001).
Tampa officials attempted to shut down VD as an adult entertainment business unlawfully
located in a residential section in violation of the city zoning laws. Id. at 1235. The effort was
unsuccessful. Id. at 1237. The court held that, because no customers actually attended the house
in which VD was located and, therefore, did not subject the neighborhood to the negative impact
the zoning provision was designed to prevent, VD did not constitute a public offering of adult
entertainment as that term is used in Tampa's City Code. Id. at 1236-37. With what may have
been a sigh of relief, the court concluded that it would "not be necessary for us to analyze the
thorny constitutional issues presented in this case." Id. at 1235.
46 I have reluctantly accepted the fact that "yeast infection" does not relate to mold on
bread; and that is all I wish to know on the subject.
47 For example, the sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona maintains a Web site showing
four camera views of life in the county jail, including the holding and search cells and the pre-
intake area. Kim Peterson, Increasing Use of Web Cams Puts Focus on Privacy Issues, Copley
News Serv., Jan. 28, 2002 (on file with The George Washington Law Review). At one point the
cameras allegedly showed people dressing and undressing and using the toilet. Id. The sheriff
explained that he installed the cameras to rebut claims that prison officials physically abuse
prisoners: "I decided to let the whole world be my jury," he said. Id. Sheriff Joe Arpaio appears
to have taken instruction from Gilbert and Sullivan's The Mikado:
My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time-
To let the punishment fit the crime-
The punishment fit the crime;
And make each prisoner pent
Unwillingly represent
A source of innocent merriment!
Of innocent merriment!
SIR W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADO 68 (MacMillan & Co. 1928) (1885). As a clever lyric in a witty
song, the concept works quite well. As a matter of social policy, however, it is unfortunate.
Granted, inmates have little, if any, expectation of privacy from prison officials. See, e.g., Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). In Bell, the Court held that neither sentenced prisoners nor
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sometimes at the expense of the famous or notorious.48
Needless to say, the informal understanding that certain topics are off-
limits has also been rejected by the mainstream media, whose role in under-
mining privacy is discussed at greater length in Part IV.A.
49
The limitations on technology; the difficulties involved in acquiring, re-
trieving and disseminating information; and the informal, but generally rec-
ognized understanding that certain information is simply nobody else's
business were all extralegal factors that substantially contributed to the pro-
tection of privacy. These factors, however, no longer contribute to privacy.
Rather, they now undermine the privacy that they previously served to
protect.
E. Who Threatens Our Privacy?
Threats to privacy come from a variety of sources, primarily govern-
ment, private individuals, commercial enterprises (particularly large corpora-
tions), and the media.
Inevitably, attention focuses primarily on the government. Other
presentations at this Symposium discussed government intrusions on privacy
at great length. My focus is on the other individuals and institutions that
threaten privacy.
pretrial detainees have Fourth Amendment protection from Bureau of Prison regulations requir-
ing all prisoners to submit to strip and body-cavity searches after every "contact visit" with a
person from outside the institution. Id. at 560. The Court upheld the regulations because this
denial of privacy was a reasonable measure to assure that contraband is not smuggled into the
institution. Id. at 559-60. To offer Web cam views of prison life to titillate the public, however,
is reminiscent of the days when the well-to-do would visit insane asylums to be entertained by
the antics of the inmates; hopefully we have progressed beyond that point, at least. See, e.g.,
Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that an inmate in a state prison
had a reasonable expectation that he would not be monitored by nonprison officials while work-
ing out in a prison gym). The use of Web cams in the Maricopa prison not only intrudes upon
the limited privacy expectation of the prisoners, but teaches disrespect for privacy generally,
even when it does so in the context of prisons and prisoners.
48 Consider mug shots. Their official purposes are: (a) to make a record of a defendant's
appearance when arrested; and (b) to provide investigators with a tool for use in future investi-
gations. Thanks to the Internet, mug shots of the famous or notorious are now also popular
entertainment. Ginia Bellafante, Headshots That Don't Guarantee the Agent Will Call Back,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2003, § 9, at 2 (showing, in addition to Michael Jackson ("Mr. Jackson
appears with the maquillage of a geisha, his eyebrows shaped like boomerangs and an expression
that seems to say, 'Please, when you're finished, may I have my gummy bears back?"'), mug
shots of Nick Nolte, Hugh Grant, Glen Campbell ("looking like a deranged member of a De-
pression-era chain gang"), Paul Reubens ("Pee-wee Herman"), and Wynonna Judd). Just about
everyone has seen the mug shot of Michael Jackson looking like a zombie of uncertain gender,
but his is not the only celebrity mugshot making the rounds. Id. At least three Web sites are
devoted to them. Id.
49 See infra Part IV.A.
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IL Betrayers, Grudgers, Spammers, and Snoops
A. Betrayers and Grudgers
When we voluntarily disclose private information to another, we do so
knowing that he or she might reveal it to others.50 Although society might
morally condemn the betrayal, it offers no formal form of relief to the be-
trayed. 51 This has been true, probably, for as long as human society has ex-
isted. What is different today, of course, is the ease with which the betrayal
can be broadcast to the world. As an object lesson, consider The Sad Affair
of Brad the Cad and Claire the Fair.
Once upon a time in Jolly Olde England, a lass named Claire and a lad
named Brad had an intimate encounter.52 Brad apparently demonstrated
such considerable skill that Claire wrote him a note of thanks in which she
described in some detail the aspects of the encounter she found particularly
satisfying.53 However adept Brad may have been at certain "manly arts," he
was no gentleman. He decided to share Claire's note with a few friends at
work.
54
If this had all happened, say, twenty years ago, Claire would have hand-
written her note, perhaps on scented stationery. Brad and his friends would
have shared a snigger at her expense. Word of the letter might have spread
to a few others, but that is as far as it would have gone.
But Brad and Claire's encounter took place in December 2000, and
Claire sent her note by e-mail (with her full name and address attached). 55
With a few clicks of his mouse, Brad forwarded the e-mail (thus adding his
own full name and address) to a few friends.56 They forwarded it to their
friends, who forwarded it to other friends, and within a very few days hun-
dreds of thousands of people had read Claire's note and Brad's smug reac-
tion to it, had added their own comments, and had passed it on to still
others.57 A Web site was established featuring the original e-mail and much
of the subsequent commentary. 58 The British press, acting with the discretion
and good taste for which it is properly famous, printed the story, including
names, addresses, and photographs of the unhappy uncouple, and hounded
them mercilessly.59 Dozens of men named Brad received abusive e-mails and
50 Cf Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("Neither this Court nor any mem-
ber of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's mis-
placed belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.").
51 Exceptions exist; unauthorized disclosure of privileged information may in some cir-
cumstances be actionable. For example, a client may sue an attorney who wrongfully discloses
information the client communicated in confidence. Similarly, medical personnel may be liable
for damages for unauthorized disclosure of a patient's medical records.








59 Id; see also T.R. Reid, Brad the Cad Disciplined but Not Fired, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
2000, at C3 (relating that Brad and the co-employees who, after receiving Brad's e-mail and
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phone calls.60 At least one woman with the same first and last name as
Claire's also received a deluge of unwanted attention-even though she re-
sides on this side of the Atlantic.
61
The Sad Affair of Brad the Cad and Claire the Fair illustrates that betray-
als of confidence now pose an enormous threat to privacy. Anyone with ac-
cess to the Internet can post information, 62 embarrassing photographs,63 and
videotapes, 64 and, for that matter, unverified allegations and outright lies
about anyone and anything. If the matter arouses sufficient public interest
(prurient or otherwise), the content may reach an audience of millions. Once
the information or image is uploaded to the Internet, the target's privacy in
the matter is gone, and the law can often offer no remedy.65
passing it on to others, were disciplined but not fired by the law firm where they worked). In the
latter article, reporter Reid wrote: "On grounds of privacy and taste, The Washington Post is not
publishing the full names of the principals or the Web site. Consequently, the hundreds of read-
ers demanding this information should get a life and leave this reporter alone." Id.
60 Reid, supra note 52.
61 After I described the Affair of Brad and Claire at the Symposium, another participant in
the Symposium related that his wife has the same name and that even now, nearly two years
later, she still receives e-mails from yahoos who assume that she is her more notorious English
namesake.
62 In accord with common journalistic standards and a court order, the media has to date
(December 2003) refrained from mentioning the name of the woman who accused L.A. Laker
basketball star Kobe Bryant of sexual assault. Nevertheless, her name, and virtually every detail
of her life, has been available on the Internet almost since the accusation became public, and a
Los Angeles radio talk show has used her name on the air on a regular basis. See, e.g., Chris
Frates, L.A. Radio Show Names Bryant's Accuser, DENVER POST, July 24, 2003, at B1. When the
editor of the Aspen Daily News announced that his paper would no longer print stories about the
Bryant trial until there was a verdict or some other aspect of the case emerged which had a
direct impact on the community the newspaper served, the decision received both praise and
criticism. See Michael Tracey, Courageous Stand of Aspen Editor: Decision to Avoid Saturation
Coverage of Kobe Bryant Case Impractical for Others, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 18, 2003, at 14C.
63 In the fall of 1998, someone posted on the Internet nude photographs of a conservative
radio talk show host taken twenty-three years earlier. James Bone, Radio Agony Aunt Apo-
logises as Nude Pictures of Her Appear on Internet, TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 1998, at 20. She
had posed for the man she was seeing at the time, long before she adopted the views for which
she is beloved by some and hated by others. Id. Newspaper articles reported that the ex-lover,
by then eighty years old, sold them for thousands of dollars to a company that specializes in
marketing salacious materials. Id.; see also David Rosenzweig, Celebrities Lose Nude Photo
Cases, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at B1. (I decline to include the name of the woman victimized
by this betrayal nor the people referred to in the next note, because to do so would, if only in a
small way, make me an accomplice in the invasion of their privacy or, in one case, in her subse-
quent exploitation of the resultant notoriety. Readers who do not know already who they are
and have a burning need to know can look it up themselves.)
64 In the fall of 1998, the Internet sleaze merchant referred to in the previous note posted
on the Internet, for its members, a sexually intimate videotape taken by a famous actor and
actress on their honeymoon. Rosenzweig, supra note 63. (How the company got its hands on
the video was never made clear.) The couple sued. Id. The company agreed to take the video
off its members-only Web site; having done so, it proceeded to sell hundreds of thousands of
copies of it to the public at large. Id. Similarly, in the fall of 2003, a video of an actress-heiress
cavorting with her (soon to be ex-) boyfriend became the primary attraction on a pornography
Web log. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Building a Web Media Empire on a Daily Dose of Fresh
Links, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at Cl.
65 See Rosenzweig, supra note 63. The judge lifted the temporary injunction which had
been granted on behalf of the radio talk show host because "the photos had been replicated
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The Internet threatens privacy because it gives someone who wishes to
betray a confidence or exercise a grudge heretofore unimaginable power to
disseminate information. This publication of private information is not only




The power to embarrass or betray confidences is also available to some-
one who acquires information or images surreptitiously, rather than by be-
trayal. The private snoop (whether acting for fun or profit) has always been
with us. Media articles and court opinions continue to relate examples of
surreptitious videotaping67 and wiretapping. 68 Miniaturization and other
technological enhancements to surveillance equipment magnify the possibili-
ties for privacy intrusion.
69
Technologies which make it more convenient for us to "keep in touch"
also make it easier for others to snoop. Cordless and cellular phones are
increasingly popular despite the fact that they are much more vulnerable to
illicit monitoring than hardwired phones. Scanners, of which an estimated
half a million are sold each year,70 are capable of monitoring cordless and
anonymously on countless news group [Web] sites, making them accessible to millions of In-
ternet users worldwide. 'Simply stated,' [lawyers for the sleaze merchant said smugly], 'the pho-
tographs are no longer "private facts .... Id.
66 Consider the words of Professor Jeffrey Rosen:
Privacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out of context in a world of
short attention spans, a world in which information can easily be confused with
knowledge.... [Wihen our reading habits or private e-mails are exposed to stran-
gers, we may be reduced, in the public eye, to nothing more than the most salacious
book we once read or the most vulgar joke we once told.
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8-9
(2000).
67 See, e.g., Deibler v. State, 776 A.2d 657, 666 (Md. 2001). Diebler was prosecuted for
hiding a video camera in a bathroom in a friend's home and taping his friend's aunt taking a
shower. Id. at 659. Interestingly, the court held that, although the videotaping itself violated no
law, the defendant could be prosecuted for unlawfully intercepting the oral communications that
were incidental to the activities that were videotaped. Id. at 666. For a similar holding, see State
v. O'Brien, 774 A.2d 89 (R.I. 2001), a prosecution of a college student who persuaded a frater-
nity brother to hide in the closet of his dorm room and secretly videotape the defendant and his
girlfriend having sex. Id. at 92. For a list of several similar acts of betrayal involving videotaping
of sexual or bathroom activity, see Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the
Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1023 n.194
(1995).
68 See, e.g., Bernard Weinraub, Talk of Wiretaps Rattles Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2003, at Cl. FBI agents searched the computer of a private investigator who has worked for,
among others, Michael Jackson, Kevin Costner, Sylvester Stallone, and Roseanne Barr, finding
what appeared to be numerous wiretap transcripts. Id. Six days later the New York Times re-
ported that the private investigator began serving a jail sentence for a weapons violation; the
investigation into his alleged wiretapping continued. Laura M. Holson & Bernard Weinraub,
Hollywood's Investigator to the Stars Heads to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at A16.
69 See supra notes 13-14 (discussing cell phone cameras and miniature camcorders).
70 See, e.g., Mary Spicuzza, Scanners' Drone Is Music to Ears of These "Freeks," SEATTLE
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at Bi.
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cellular phone transmissions. 71 Wireless "nanny-cams," which permit busy
parents to monitor how in-home childcare providers treat their children, also
permit anyone with a computer equipped with a receiver to view the
images. 72 It would pose no great challenge for the snoop to release "news-
worthy" information thus obtained to the media, as has happened more than
once,73 or, for that matter, to post such illicitly obtained conversations,
images, or information on the Internet.
71 The signals from the earliest cordless phones could sometimes be picked up on ordinary
AM or FM radios, baby monitors, and the like, and, therefore, were not legally protected from
monitoring. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566
(explaining the lack of legal protection for cordless phones in the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986). Improvements ironed out these problems, but cordless phone transmis-
sions were still highly susceptible to interception by scanners. (Most scanner enthusiasts use the
devices to monitor police, fire, and airline radio communications, but many of the scanners are
also equipped to scan the frequencies on which cordless and cellular phone calls are transmit-
ted.) Nevertheless, political pressure from the telecommunications industry ultimately per-
suaded Congress to afford some protection to cordless phone users in 1994. See FISHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 29, § 3:19. As of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act ("CALEA") of 1994, cordless phone transmissions now receive the same legal protection as
cellular and hard-wired phone calls. Id. § 3:19. Continued improvements in cordless technology
make cordless phone transmissions somewhat less vulnerable to scanner monitoring. See Mar-
garet Bernstein, Here's the Bottom Line on Cordless Phones, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar.
24, 2002, at L3; David Colker, New Digital Telephones Go the Distance, L.A. TIMES, July 24,
2003, at F8. Cell telephone technology and the law's treatment of cell phones followed a similar
path. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 29, § 3:16.
72 John Schwartz, Nanny-Cam May Leave a Home Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, at
Al. It is not even clear whether the unauthorized monitoring of such transmissions violates
federal law. A wireless camera transmission is an "electronic communication" and, therefore, is
protected by the Wiretap Act only if its signal is "transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign com-
merce." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000). Whether a wireless camera that transmits an image a few
hundred feet is a "system that affects interstate or foreign commerce" is far from clear.
73 The best known incident involved then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich. A Florida
couple, the Martins, randomly (but illegally) scanned a phone call between Speaker Gingrich
and three other Republican congressmen, including Representative Boehner (who participated
via his cell phone). Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Realizing that
the conversation contained information that would prove embarrassing to the Speaker, the Mar-
tins taped it. Id. The couple, whose loyalty to the Democratic Party surpassed their respect for
the rule of law, informed Florida Democratic Representative Thurman, whose respect for the
law and the right to privacy did not prevent her from suggesting that they get the tape to Repre-
sentative McDermott, the then-ranking member of the House Ethics Committee(!). Id. Repre-
sentative Thurman also assured the Martins that they could expect immunity from prosecution
for the unlawful interception and disclosure, Id. Representative Thurman was wrong; the Mar-
tins were prosecuted, pled guilty, and were fined $500, the maximum penalty at the time. Id.
Representative McDermott, whose dedication to partisan advantage in turn surpassed his devo-
tion to congressional ethics, gave copies of the tape to the New York Times, the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, and Roll Call. Id. Representative Boehner sued Representative McDermott, al-
leging unlawful disclosure of the intercepted call. Id. The D.C. Circuit held that McDermott's
conduct was not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 476. One judge concluded that the
act of giving the tape to the newspapers, which constituted an unlawful disclosure under 18
U.S.C.A. § 2511, did not constitute "speech," id. at 477-78 (Randolph, J.), and another con-
cluded that McDermott's conduct did constitute speech but was nevertheless unprotected, id. at
478 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The third judge dissented. Id. at 480 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
While certiorari from the Supreme Court was pending, the Court decided Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514 (2001), holding that the federal statute making it a crime to knowingly disclose the
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The Internet also threatens privacy because it can be used in many ways
to acquire information surreptitiously. Illicit computer hacking is a huge fi-
nancial problem for businesses and leaves confidential records vulnerable to
electronic intruders .74 "WiFi ,' 75 wireless access to the Internet, provides the
considerable convenience of permitting a computer user to log on without
having to plug in physically; 76 it may also leave the user extremely vulnerable
contents of an unlawfully intercepted communication could not constitutionally apply to some-
one who did not participate in the interception when the matter was one of public concern.
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535; see also infra notes 208-238 and accompanying text. On May 29, 2001,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in McDermott, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the
D.C. Circuit for further consideration in light of Bartnicki. McDermott v. Boehner, 532 U.S.
1050 (2001). The D.C. Circuit, per curiam, remanded to the district court. Boehner v. McDer-
mott, 22 Fed. Appx. 16, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001). As this footnote is being written, the district court
has each side's motions for summary judgment under consideration.
In a somewhat similar case, a Dallas couple intercepted cordless phone calls by a neighbor,
a prominent school board official with whom they were feuding. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221
F.3d 158, 163-64 (5th Cir. 2000). The conversations revealed that the official was a bigot who,
with other board members, was striving to marginalize nonwhite members of the school board
and also was involved in some remarkably shady dealings with rather questionable people, in-
cluding one who had done time for manslaughter. Peavy v. New Times, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 532,
533-34 (N.D. Tex. 1997). The couple informed the media, and several rounds of litigation en-
sued. Id. at 536-57. The key difference in the two cases is that in Peavy, the TV station, una-
ware that Congress had amended the Wiretap Act to protect cordless phone calls, actively
encouraged the couple to continue to intercept Peavy's calls. See Peavy, 221 F.3d at 164. The
Fifth Circuit held that the First Amendment did not protect the TV station from suit under the
Wiretap Act. Id. at 193.
A third case, Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003), bears several similarities
to Peavy: it involved feuding neighbors, a cordless phone, and a supposedly media-savvy institu-
tion, the Anti-Defamation League ("ADL"), which, like the television station in Peavy, was
unaware that the law regarding cordless phones had changed. See Quigley, 327 F.3d at 1047-53;
Peavy, 221 F.3d at 163-64. The ADL ultimately used the illegally intercepted calls to publicize
trumped-up allegations of anti-Semitism against the Quigleys. Quigley, 327 F.3d at 1051-55.
Unlike the interceptions in Peavy, which clearly involved matters of public concern, however,
the conversations in Quigley did not; thus the Tenth Circuit, post-Bartnicki, affirmed the
Quigleys' judgment against the ADL. Id. at 1074.
For a more detailed discussion of Boehner and Peavy, see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra
note 29, § 4:12.1-:12.2.
74 The New York Times has reported that "[tihe number of successful, and verifiable,
worldwide hacker incidents for the month of January [2003] is likely to surpass 20,000," and that
in a recent survey of 500 computer security practitioners, eighty percent acknowledged financial
losses to computer breaches. Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report: Crime Is Soaring in Cyber-
space, but Many Companies Keep It Quiet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at C4. "Of the 223 respon-
dents who quantified the damage, the average loss was $2 million. Those who had sustained
losses of proprietary company information said each incident cost an average of $6.5 million,
while financial fraud averaged $4.5 million an incident." Id.
75 The term is short for "wireless fidelity."
76 See, e.g., Scott Kirsner, Wireless, Wireless, Everywhere, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 2003,
at Cl; Jonathan Krim, WiFi is Open, Free and Vulnerable to Hackers: Safeguarding Wireless Net-
works Too Much Trouble for Many Users, WASH. POST, July 27, 2003, at Al. Wireless access can
be obtained for as little as a $70 antenna. Kirsner, supra. Many retail establishments provide
WiFi to attract business-coffee shops, sandwich shops, even some McDonald's restaurants have
done so. Roy Furchgott, A Tall Decaf Mocha Cappuccino and the Wi-Fi Selection of the Month,
Please, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at C4. Starbucks has begun to offer more, including free music
videos or free streaming holiday stories from National Public Radio. Id. A number of truck stop
companies now provide WiFi access to truckers and other motorists at rates ranging from $1 for
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to someone who wants to access the Internet on a WiFi user's account or to
someone seeking to "steal data, introduce viruses, launch spam or attack
other computers. '77 In fact, the vulnerability of wireless systems has given
rise to a hobby, called "war driving," in which hobbyists and hackers drive
around with receiver-equipped computers, logging "hot spots"-areas where
wireless transmitters allow Internet access over the air-and then compiling
and comparing their information at conventions.
78
The Internet also allows cookies, 79 spyware, 80 and snoopware8l to be in-
stalled remotely. These programs permit the installer to monitor how the
targeted computer is used.82 These products may violate the law,83 and even
fifteen minutes to $99 for an annual subscription (although the latter will soon be raised to $199
a year). Jeannette Borzo, Roam the Web While at the Wheel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at G5; see
also Jeanette Borzo, Head Out (Wirelessly) on the Highway, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at G5
(reporting that the number of WiFi users nationwide is expected to reach 4 million in 2003, up
from 1.9 million in 2002). Homeowners can equip their homes for wireless access from any room
in the house. Krim, supra, reports that in 2002, 3.1 million households had wireless networks.
The number of households using wireless networks is likely to double in 2003. Id.
77 Krim, supra note 76; see also Kirsner, supra note 76. In thirty seconds, the president of
a computer security consulting firm, walking all of forty-five feet down the Avenue of the Ameri-
cas in Manhattan, located at least thirteen separate wireless networks that were vulnerable to
hacking. Erik Sherman, Walk-By Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
Although WiFi comes equipped with an encryption system, it can be confusing to enter the
encryption codes, and using it can prevent connected systems from functioning properly with
each other. Krim, supra note 76. Thus, most people with WiFi do not use the encryption system.
Id.
78 Krim, supra note 76 (reporting estimates that the number of "hot spots" in the world
was roughly 20,000 in 2002 and will increase to approximately 150,000 by 2005). Products are
now available that permit a network administrator to see who is on a wireless network and
where they are and allow them to limit or deny access to certain individuals or locations. Kir-
sner, supra note 76.
79 See infra Part II.B.
80 See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., GHOSTS IN OUR MACHINES: BACKGROUND AND
POLICY PROPOSALS ON THE "SPYWARE" PROBLEM (2003). The report defines "spyware" as "key
stroke loggers and screen capture utilities, which are installed by a third party to monitor work
habits, observe online behavior, or capture passwords and other information," and "'adware'
and similar applications that install themselves surreptitiously through 'drive-by downloads' or
by piggybacking on other applications and track users' behaviors and take advantage of their
Internet connection." Id. at 2. Similarly:
Spyware is installed surreptitiously as an add-on to other programs, and tracks your
computer use for the benefit of Web advertisers. It often displays ads but, like any
mischievous application set loose in Windows, can do much worse-potentially an-
ything, including steal your confidential information or erase your hard drive.
Rob Pegoraro, Cookies and Spyware, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2003, at F6.
81 See John Schwartz, When Free Isn't Really Free: That Song You Just Downloaded May
Cost You Your Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, § 3, at 1 (reporting that many programs and
services offered for free on the Internet surreptitiously implant "adware," "spyware," and
"snoopware" on the hard drives of unwitting recipients).
The definitions are fuzzy, but the privacy-intrusive programs fall under three broad catego-
ries: "adware," which serves pop-up ads and banners, including some for pornography; true
"spyware," which monitors Web wanderings for marketing purposes; and more insidious "snoop-
ware," which can track everything users do on their computers, whether or not they are online.
Some programs can even disable antivirus software and hijack the results of Web searches. Id.
82 See John Schwartz, Snoop Software Is Generating Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
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if they do not, the advertisements almost certainly do.84 This fact has not
deterred manufacturers of some of these products in the past,8 5 however, and
it is unlikely to do so now.
86
The Internet has also given rise to a new specialty, which might be called
"document reconstruction." When a document is posted on the Web with
blacked-out material, that material now can be retrieved. 87 Where material
was deleted to protect officials from appropriate criticism, the tendency is to
rejoice that "they didn't get away with it." Nevertheless, use of the technique
can also compromise legitimate privacy interests and imposes on someone
seeking to post such a document the additional expense and effort of produc-
ing a new electronic version of the document with the confidential informa-
tion deleted altogether, not merely blacked over.
88
The victim of Internet-aided intrusions may lose more than his or her
privacy; identity theft is also a growing problem, and misuse of the Internet is
a significant contributor.89 In August 2003, the New York Times reported a
case that illustrates how a clever thief with sufficient skills can victimize the
unwary. 90 The thief illicitly installed key loggers on computers available for
10, 2003, at Cl (reporting, among other things, that a company called LoverSpy "promises to let
buyers '[s]py on anyone by sending them an e-mail greeting card!"').
83 It is a crime to manufacture, advertise, ship, or possess any device, "knowing or having
reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the
surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (2000).
84 It is a crime to advertise "any other electronic, mechanical, or other device [whether the
device is "primarily useful" for unlawful interceptions or not], where such advertisement pro-
motes the use of such device for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(c)(ii).
85 Defendants in § 2512 cases sometimes maintain that it is lawful to sell communications
interception equipment so long as the salesperson tells the buyer that it would be against the law
to use the equipment without the consent of a participant. See United States v. Wynn, 633 F.
Supp. 595, 606 (C.D. Ill. 1986); see also United States v. Bast, 495 F.2d 138, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 450, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). This is a pseudo
defense because the statute clearly states that if the equipment itself is "primarily useful" for
unlawful interception of communications, its manufacture, advertisement, sale, shipment, or pos-
session is per se unlawful. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(c)(i); see also FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note
29, § 2:41.
86 It is no surprise that this pseudo defense is being asserted by the manufacturers of inva-
sive software. See Schwartz, supra note 82.
87 See, e.g., Tom McNichol, Peeking Behind the Curtain of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2003, at G7 (relating how a self-described "information archeologist" retrieved blacked-out por-
tions of an internal Department of Justice report criticizing the Department's efforts toward
diversity in hiring).
88 In 2000, the New York Times posted on its Web site portions of a classified CIA docu-
ment discussing the 1953 coup in Iran that placed the current Shah on the throne in that country.
Unediting the Editing of a Report, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 2003, at A19. Although the newspaper
removed the names of Iranian agents from the document, a computer expert was able to delete
the black boxes and read the names underneath. Id.
89 According to a Federal Trade Commission survey, more than 27 million people were
victims of identity theft between 1998 and 2002, including 9.9 million in 2002 alone. Identity
Theft Hits 27 Million Since '98: More Awareness Slowing Growth, CMI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2003, § 3,
at 3. All told, the crimes cost victims $5 billion, and businesses and financial institutions lost
about $48 billion. Id.
90 Lisa Napoli, The Kinko's Caper: Burglary by Modem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.7, 2003, at G1.
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public use at several Kinko's copy shops in Manhattan. 91 When someone
using one of these computers entered personal or financial data, the thief
collected the data; when a user accessed a home computer (using a program
called GoToMyPC), revealing his or her password in the process, the thief
gleaned still more information from files on the home computer's hard
drive. 92 The thief sold some of this information on the Internet and used
other information to raid bank accounts, transfer assets, et cetera. 93 He was
caught because one victim reported that while watching television, he heard
his computer turn on and watched the intruder open various files.
94
As to some of these activities, it is clear that the conduct is both wrong
and unlawful. First, the private, unauthorized interception of communica-
tions is a crime. 95 The subsequent disclosure and use of such communications
(except by the media!) 96 is also a crime, so long as the prosecutor can show
that the person disclosing or using the information knew, or had reason to
know, that the communication was intercepted unlawfully. 97 Unlawful inter-
ception, disclosure, and use also provide a basis for civil liability.98 Second,
unauthorized access to stored electronic communications is a crime99 and is
civilly actionable. 1°° Finally, the same is true of unauthorized access of a
"protected computer" and the information stored thereon, 101 although the
civil remedy is limited because an act of unlawful access must result in costs
or damages of at least $5,000 to be actionable. 0 2 And, of course, any crimi-
nal act committed with the use of such information is by definition also crimi-
nal. Such intrusions are easy to commit, while detection and apprehension is
often difficult and sometimes impossible. 0 3 At least the legal status and





95 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).
96 See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
97 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)-(d).
98 The victim of an unlawful interception or disclosure may be entitled to actual, liqui-
dated, and punitive damages. 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
99 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
oo 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
101 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). "Protected computer" is defined as a
computer:
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Govern-
ment, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a
financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting
the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a
computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects
interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States ....
Id. § 1030(e)(2).
102 18 U.S.C. § 1030(1)(4) (2000); see infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
103 Someone using a scanner to unlawfully monitor cordless and cell phone conversations
leaves no electronic trail to follow; cases of such monitoring come to light only if the criminal is
indiscreet enough to disclose or use the contents of the conversations in a way that allows the
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Some forms of electronic snooping by private individuals, however, are
unregulated by law, and the rightness or wrongness of the action is unclear.
For example:
(1) It is perfectly lawful to search out information about someone from a
variety of sources to accumulate a profile. Whether it is right or wrong to do
so depends on why the profile is being accumulated and the use to which it
will be put.
(2) It is perfectly legal to post lawfully obtained information, photo-
graphs, videos, and the like on the Internet-even if the underlying purpose
is to embarrass someone and to undermine their public image. That it is not
illegal, however, does not make it right to do so.
(3) Reconstruction of edited documents violates no law, except perhaps
where state secrets are involved, even though in some instances it may de-
prive an author of the right to control the version of his or her work that is
released to the public.
C. Spammers
Spam, whether seeking suckers to defraud,104 offering pornography or
various physical or performance enhancements,105 or advertising from main-
stream enterprises, 10 6 intrudes into privacy because it interferes with our abil-
ity to communicate with others and our ability to use our computers. Spam
diverts time and attention away from more important matters. Despite mea-
sures that the law and Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") take to suppress
spam,'10 7 it threatens to overwhelm efforts to control it, 108 particularly be-
cause spanmers have now begun to employ Trojan horses that enable them
to take over other computers and use other computers to send more spam.
This procedure prevents investigators from tracing either rogue programs or
spam back to its source.10 9 Web sites now exist where hackers who have
victim of the monitoring to learn about it. A number of cases have been widely publicized. See
supra note 73.
104 Is there anyone left who has not been given the opportunity to make a quick profit from
a mysterious Nigerian bank account?
105 The "performances" in question do not involve the violin.
106 See Saul Hansell, It Isn't Just the Peddlers of Pills: Big Companies Add to Spam Flow,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at Al (reporting that companies such as Palm, Bank of America, SBC
Communications, and Sprint are trading customers' e-mail addresses and are sending the ad-
dressees advertisements for a wide range of goods and services).
107 See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing ("CAN-
SPAM") Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7701 (West 2004) (creating penalties, in the form of fines
and jail time, for individuals and companies that send out junk e-mails to recipients who have
indicated that they wish to unsubscribe from mailing lists).
108 According to Brightmail, a developer of spam filters, forty-one percent of total Internet
e-mail was identified as spam in December 2001, and that percentage has increased each month
since. BRIGHTMAIL, SPAM STATISTICS, at http://www.brightmail.com/spamstats.html (last visited
Aug. 12, 2004). In November 2003, spam was fifty-six percent of all e-mails. Id.
109 See John Schwartz, Hackers Steal From Pirates, to No Good End, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2003, at C2. An "enormous rise in the volume of spam" occurred during the summer of 2003,
when several versions of the SoBig virus began to circulate; it turned out that SoBig included a
Trojan horse that directed infected computers to send spam. Id. A later virus, MiMail, "caused
infected machines to attack the computers of organizations that fight spare." Id. The latest
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developed a network of infected machines offer to rent out that network to
spammers and scammers for fun and, with increasing regularity, profit.11°
III. Corporate Information Gathering
Commercial enterprises intrude into privacy in many ways. One method
is to force unwanted advertisements into our homes. Junk mail is ubiquitous.
Unsolicited telemarketing has become so annoying that, when Congress re-
cently enacted legislation allowing people to place their names on a national
"do not call" list, irate recipients signed up more than 735,000 home, fax, and
cell phone numbers on the list the first day. 1 At one point, numbers were
being added to the list at a rate of 108 per second,1 2 and 19.6 million num-
bers were signed onto the list in the first ten days. 113 While most e-mail spain
is generated by businesses with questionable legitimacy, mainstream corpora-
tions also have used spain to advertise their products and services."
14
This section of the Article focuses on a more-direct intrusion, corporate
information gathering. When it comes to monitoring and information gather-
ing by business enterprises, the law fails to protect privacy adequately. In the
aggregate, corporate America has a more powerful motive and far greater
resources to develop information about each of us than either the govern-
ment or private snoops.
This section briefly addresses the threat to privacy posed by lawful busi-
ness monitoring and information gathering in three contexts: (1) employer
monitoring of employee communications and other activities; (2) corporate
use of computer "cookies" to monitor a customer's online activities, and (3)
corporate use of customer "bonus cards" to gather information about indi-
vidual consumers.
A. Employer Monitoring of Employee Communications and Other
Activities
Many businesses could not survive without providing telephones, com-
puters, e-mail, and Internet access to their employees. Inevitably, employees
will use such equipment for personal as well as business purposes. It is just as
inevitable that an employer or supervisor may become curious as to how a
particular employee, or employees in general, use the equipment. This curi-
osity might be prompted by simple nosiness, or it might be motivated by
Trojan horse, called Sinit, hijacks infected computers "to serve pop-up advertisements and to
download 'porn dialers,' programs that cause the victim's machine to turn on the modem and
place expensive pay-per-minute phone calls." Id.
110 Id. The founder of an Internet security company described the development of Trojan
horse-created "peer-to-peer networks" as "scary," among other reasons, because it demonstrates
that hackers, whose primary motive for breaking into systems was once the thrill of being able to
do so, now increasingly are operating from a profit motive. Id.
111 Anitha Reddy, 108 People Per Second Tell FTC Hotline: "Do Not Call," WASH. POST,
June 28, 2003, at Al.
112 Id.; Matt Richtel, National Do-Not-Call Registry Overwhelmed by Eager Public, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2003, at C2.
113 Don Oldenburg, Millions Answer Yes to No-Call, WASH. POST, July 8, 2003, at C9.
114 See Hansell, supra note 106.
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legitimate business concerns. Whatever the reason, is it lawful for the em-
ployer to electronically monitor how one or more employees use such
equipment? 15
With regard to telephones, the answer is that it is lawful only sometimes
for employers to monitor use of equipment, and then only under carefully
limited circumstances. With regard to computers, e-mail, and Internet activi-
ties, the answer is yes, without qualification. It is lawful to monitor employ-
ees' use, regardless of motive or circumstances.
Employers, sometimes legitimately and sometimes not, place cameras
that enable them to surveil employee activities. On this subject, the law is
mostly a blank page.
1. Telephone Monitoring
The Wiretap Act states a basic rule: interception of a wire communica-
tion is a crime and is civilly actionable. 116 The statute contains several excep-
tions, and those that are relevant are outlined below. The law's basic
assumption is that such interception is unlawful. If an employer has moni-
tored telephone communications, the burden is on the employer to demon-
strate that the circumstances fall within one of the exceptions.
a. The Consensual Interception Exception
The first exception is found at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d):
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communi-
cation where such person is a party to the communication or where
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.117
115 For a more detailed discussion, see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 29, §§ 7:5-:10.
116 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000). The statute makes it a crime (exceptions aside) to inter-
cept a wire, oral, or electronic communication. Id. The definition of "wire communication"
includes telephone conversations; it includes use of cellular and cordless telephones, as well as
hard-wired phones. See id. § 2510(1). See generally FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 29,
§§ 2:1-:8, 4:3.
117 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). Thirty-four states follow the federal approach: Alabama, Ari-
zona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Loui-
siana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. FISHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 29, § 6:39; see, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-30(1), 13A-11-31 (1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (Michie 1998). In thirteen states, all participants must consent:
Alaska, Arkansas, California (more or less), Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland (does the name
"Linda Tripp" ring a bell?-pun intended, see infra note 201), Massachusetts, Michigan, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 29,
§ 6:39. Nevada permits one-party consensual interceptions of face-to-face conversations, NEV.
REV. STAT. 200.650 (2001), and requires one-party consent for telephone conversations, NEV.
REV. STAT. 200.620 (2001). The law in New Mexico and Vermont is unclear. For a detailed
discussion, see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 29, § 6:38.
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The consent exception applies most often in a business context when an
employer, for "quality control purposes," monitors (i.e., listens to or records)
the phone conversations of employees who deal regularly with the public.
The employer may invoke the consent defense only by showing that the em-
ployee knew, or at least had actual notice, that such monitoring would oc-
cur. 118 Of particular importance, "consent within the meaning of section
2511(2)(d) is not necessarily an all or nothing proposition; it can be lim-
ited." 19 Thus, that employees consented to the monitoring of their business-
related calls does not mandate the conclusion that they also consented to the
monitoring of personal calls.' 20
b. The "Ordinary Course of Business" Exception
A second defense is that no "interception" occurred as that term is de-
fined in the Wiretap Act. "Intercept" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) as
"the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other de-
vice.' 1 21 If the employer did not use "any ... device," then no interception
has occurred. "[Dievice," in turn, is defined, in pertinent part, as:
(5) "Electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication other than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or
any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a
provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordi-
nary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user
in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber
or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in
the ordinary course of its business .... 122
118 Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that the key issue in an
implied consent inquiry is "whether the parties were given sufficient notice"); Griffin v. City of
Milwaukee, 74 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 1996); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581
(11th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing consent to monitoring of business calls with consent to monitor-
ing of personal calls); Deal v. Spears, 780 F. Supp. 618, 622 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (rejecting defen-
dant's implied consent defense); Jandak v. Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 824-25 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(upholding consent defense where plaintiff should have known his calls were monitored based
on his "training and job situation"); Curley v. Bd. of Trs., 624 N.Y.S.2d 265, 265 (App. Div.
1995). Cf Hart v. Clearfield City, 815 F. Supp. 1544, 1548 (D. Utah 1993) (finding that use of a
telephone line that plaintiff knew was recorded defeated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for violation
of plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Fis-MAN
& McKENNA, supra note 29, §§ 6:42, 7:6.
119 Watkins, 704 F.2d at 582.
120 Id. at 581-82.
121 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (emphasis added).
122 Id. § 2510. Section 2510(5)(a)(ii) exempts devices "being used by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or
law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties." Id. § 2510(5)(a)(ii). Subsection
(5)(b) also exempts from the definition "a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct
subnormal hearing to not better than normal." Id. § 2510(5)(b).
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This section has become known as both the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" exception 123 and, somewhat less accurately, as the "extension phone
exception. ' 12 4 The applicability of this defense depends on two factors: (1)
the nature of the equipment used to overhear or record the phone call; and
(2) the circumstances and purposes of the interception.
(1) Equipment used. Courts generally interpret 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i)
to include standard telephone equipment provided by either the provider of
telecommunication services or by the subscriber and not to include equip-
ment specially designed or modified for wiretapping. 125 Courts are divided
on whether this provision applies to standard telecommunications systems
with built-in monitoring capacities.
126
(2) Purpose and circumstances. The second element of the "no intercep-
tion" defense is that the call was monitored in the "ordinary course" of the
employer's business. The statute does not define "ordinary." As the courts
have applied the provision, "ordinary" does not mean routine or regular. An
employer cannot immunize itself from civil liability for unauthorized moni-
toring merely by conducting such monitoring as a matter of routine. On the
other hand, the monitoring need not have been routine or in accordance with
established policy to have been "in the ordinary course of [the employer's]
business." Rather, to be "in the ordinary course," the monitoring must have
a legitimate business purpose and be reasonable in scope and duration.
127
Regardless of the ostensible purpose, indiscriminate monitoring is likely
to be civilly actionable. 12
In short, an employer may monitor an employee's phone calls made
from the work place but must do so warily, taking care to consider the nature
of the equipment used, the justification for the monitoring, how it is con-
ducted, and how the information is used and disclosed. Upon learning of the
monitoring, the employee may bring a civil action in federal court, placing
the burden on the employer to establish its legality.
123 See, e.g., Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 2001); Sheinbrot v.
Pfeffer, No. 93 CV 5343, 1995 WL 432608, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 1995); see also Bunnell v.
Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 825 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing "ordinary course of law
enforcement duties").
124 See, e.g., Stinson v. Larson, No. 2020918, 2004 WL 541826, at *2 (Ala. Civ. App. Mar.
19, 2004) (discussing "extension-telephone exception"); Britton v. Britton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 276,
281 (D. Me. 2002) (same); Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d 547, 553 (Mass. App. Ct.
2002); Shana K. Rahavy, The Federal Wiretap Act: The Permissible Scope of Eavesdropping in the
Family Home, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 87, 90 (2003). The phrase "extension-phone" is somewhat
inaccurate because, although the exception does apply to the standard extension phone, it also
applies to far more sophisticated equipment. See generally FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note
29, §§ 2:31-:35.
125 See generally FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 29, § 7:4.
126 See generally id.
127 Id. § 7.5. Legitimate purposes may include monitoring employees' conversations with
customers and other members of the public, see id. § 7:6; monitoring employees suspected of
misconduct, see id. § 7:7; monitoring to determine whether an employee is violating a policy
banning use of company phones for personal phone calls, see id. § 7:8; and various other pur-
poses, id. § 7:9.
128 Id. § 7:10.
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2. Employee E-mail12 9
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA"). 130 That statute included the Stored Communications Act.131 Sec-
tion 2701 of the Stored Communications Act permits an employer who is also
an e-mail service provider to lawfully access employees' stored or archived e-
mail without the knowledge or permission of employees.
132
Section 2701(a) makes it a crime, punishable by either one or five years
in prison, depending on the circumstances, for a person to access stored elec-
tronic communications without proper authority.133 An exception, however,
is codified in § 2701(c): "Exceptions.-Subsection (a) of this section does not
apply with respect to conduct authorized-(1) by the person or entity provid-
ing a wire or electronic communications service .... "134
This provision gives the ISP the unrestricted right to sift all messages
stored in its central computer. The legislative history contains no explicit
explanation.135 In theory, therefore, when individuals subscribe to a com-
mercial ISP, they surrender all right to privacy in any communication they
send or receive via that ISP.
In practice, however, most commercial ISPs respect and protect the pri-
vacy of their customers. They do so for a very good reason: enough of their
subscribers insist on it. A commercial ISP with an inadequate privacy policy
will lose business. Thus, although a commercial ISP's subscribers lack statu-
tory protection against the ISP's examination of stored communications, they
do have contractual protection.
136
When employees use an Internet service provided by their employer,
however, such contractual protection is lacking, and there is no legal impedi-
ment to the employer's post-transmission examination of employees' e-mails
or Web browsing. 137 An employer may have a perfectly good reason to ex-
129 Aspects of this discussion are adapted from a prior publication. See id. § 3:22.
130 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000 & Supp.
I 2001).
131 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000 & Supp. I 2001) (Stored Communications Act).
132 Id. § 2701.
133 The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) is set forth infra note 169.
134 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1).
135 Neither congressional report on the ECPA contains any explanation as to why an ISP is
given total freedom to access stored communications and fails to make any reference to the
privacy implications of employer-provided e-mail and Internet access. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at
36 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3590 (restating the language of the provision
without further explanation or comment); H. REP. No. 99-647, at 64 (1986) (same).
136 See, e.g., AOL.coM, PRIVACY POLICY, at http://www.aol.com/info/privacy.adp (last mod-
ified Apr. 8, 2003) (specifying what information AOL collects from its customers and those who
visit its Web sites, how such information is collected, how a subscriber may opt out of certain
services by declining to permit certain information from being accumulated, and assuring that no
information about a user's visits to AOL.com or any of its Web sites will be used by AOL or
shared with anyone except "in response to legal process, such as a court order or subpoena, or in
special cases such as physical threat to you or others"); PEOPLEPC, PRIVACY POLICY, at http://
www.peoplepc.com/online/legals.asp?locid=l&pageid=l (last modified July 6, 2004); NETZERO,
NETZERO, INC. PRIVACY STATEMENT, at http://www.netzero.net/legal/privacy.html (last updated
Mar. 26, 2004).
137 An employer who monitors an employee's e-mails as the employee sends or receives
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amine a particular employee's e-mails. If an employee uses company e-mail
to harass or libel someone or to inflict trade disparagement, the employer
may be held liable. 138 Likewise, an employer is entitled to take reasonable
steps to assure that an employee does not spend inordinate time attending to
personal e-mail, shopping online, or visiting pornographic Web sites while
"on the clock."
But these legitimate employer concerns about employee use of the In-
ternet apply equally to employees' use of the telephone. Still, while the
Wiretap Act presumes all phone conversations are protected and obliges the
employer to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose to justify monitoring,
the Stored Communications Act gives the employer/ISP the unrestricted
right to make a post-transmission examination of employees' every e-mail
and Web-surf. There is no logical reason for this dichotomy. Indeed, one of
the purposes of the ECPA was to protect the privacy of phone calls transmit-
ted via private telephone networks on the same basis as those transmitted by
telecommunications companies, 139 and nothing in the ECPA's legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress intended to create a dichotomy with regard to
workplace Internet access.
The Wiretap Act's protection of employee phone calls should also apply
to employee e-mails, whether monitored during transmission or examined as
stored communications. Congress should amend § 2701(c)(1) to permit an
employer/ISP to access an employee's stored electronic communications only
with the consent of the employee or in the "ordinary course of [the ISP-
employer's] business." This will ensure that the employer/ISP has the au-
them has "intercepted" those communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2511(1) and would be
subject to the less permissive provisions of the Wiretap Act set forth supra note 116. See 18
U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000) (defining "intercept"). A second provision provides that it is lawful for
an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication
service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic commu-
nication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of
his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the
rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider
of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public
shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or
service quality control checks.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000 & Supp. 1 2001). Except in such circumstances, the employer-as-
provider-of-electronic-communication-services may not intercept an employee's e-mail during
the brief instant that it is being transmitted. Id. Once transmission is complete, however, moni-
toring the stored copy of the communication is regulated by the Stored Communications Act-
which gives the employer/ISP carte blanche. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
138 See Harley v. McCoach, 928 F. Supp. 533, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Michael K. McChrystal,
William C. Gleisner III & Michael J. Kuborn, Coping with the Legal Perils of Employee Email,
72 Wis. LAW. 10, 12 (1999); see also Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
139 "It does not make sense that a phone call transmitted via common carrier is protected
by the current federal wiretap statute, while the same phone call transmitted via a private tele-
phone network such as those used by many major U.S. corporations today, would not be covered
by the statute." S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986), at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556; see
also H.R. REP. No. 99-647 (1986), at 18 (noting that "totally private systems are rapidly being
developed by private companies for their own use" and that "these networks.., are not covered
by existing Federal law").
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thority to access such communications when a legitimate need exists and at
the same time provide a degree of privacy protection to the employee.1
40
Until Congress amends § 2701(c)(1), the only available stopgap is for
employers to respect their employees' privacy voluntarily. An employer
should ensure that employees know that copies of all their incoming and out-
going e-mail are accessible to supervisors even after the employee deletes it
from his or her hard drive.141 The employer should require that employees
be informed that the employer reserves the right to review an employee's e-
mails and other online activity for valid business purposes.
142
3. Video Surveillance
Anecdotal evidence suggests that increasingly employers are subjecting
employees to video surveillance, usually intentionally, but sometimes not.
1 43
Sometimes the surveillance is with advance notice and sometimes without.
44
140 Of course, the employee has the option of using the employer-provided e-mail system
strictly for business purposes and conducting his personal e-mail correspondence and Web-surf-
ing on a home computer with a commercial ISP. But this is inconvenient, just as it would be to
never use the office phone to speak to family members, make doctor's appointments, or conduct
other personal business during working hours.
141 It is surprising and a little sad that many people are still unaware of this fact. Lt. Col.
Oliver North, who was the central figure in the "Iran-Contra" affair in the late 1980s, is perhaps
the best known individual to learn of this ongoing accessibility of deleted e-mails. See Karen
Thmulty & Sara Fritz, The Iran-Contra Hearings: Assumed Reagan Knew of Diversion-North,
L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1987, Part I, at 6; Lawrence J. Magid, Computer File: As North Learned,
Deleted Files are Retrievable, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1987, Part IV, at 4. ("Wow, were we wrong"
was how North described the unpleasant discovery. Id.) For a detailed discussion of the prose-
cution of North, see LAWRENCE E. WALSH, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT, 1
FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATrERS 105 (1993).
142 Where the employer is the government, the situation becomes somewhat more compli-
cated because the Fourth Amendment regulates government searches and seizures even in con-
texts unrelated to traditional law enforcement. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718
(1987) (holding that, in some situations, a public employee may have a reasonable expectation to
privacy in his desk or in filing cabinets located in his office). In United States v. Simons, 29 F.
Supp. 2d 324, 327 (E.D. Va. 1998), affd in part, 206 F.3d 392, 404 (4th Cir.), remanded to 107 F.
Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Va. 2000), a federal district court held that a government employee lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his Internet activities or his hard drive, where the agency's
official policy informed employees that their use of government-owned computers was subject to
review and that an automatic record was made and kept of Internet access from those com-
puters. The court thus upheld a search which revealed numerous pornographic photographs
downloaded onto Simons's computer. Id.
143 See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1424-27 (8th Cir.
1991). Organizers of a fashion show at a convention center set up a curtained dressing area for
the models, unaware that the area was visible on one of the convention center's security cam-
eras. Id. at 1424. Guards in the security control room used the surveillance camera to watch and
videotape the models changing clothes. Id. Although the curtained area was used by all of the
models and presumably was accessible to the show's director and assistants, the court neverthe-
less (and correctly) held that the models had a cause of action for invasion of privacy predicated
on the video surveillance. Id. at 1427.
144 See, e.g., Roberts v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 788 S.W.2d 107, 108, 111 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that a school teacher had no legal complaint when school officials videotaped her
classroom performance, with her knowledge but over her objection, because she had no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy while teaching).
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Sometimes it is with a legitimate business purpose and sometimes without. 145
Sometimes the surveillance is guided by discretion and common sense, and
sometimes it is not.146 In the absence of legislation regulating such surveil-
lance, so long as the cameras capture only visual images and not sounds, only
in rare instances would such surveillance be criminal.1 47 Thus, whether the
employee is liable for civil damages depends on general tort law, rather than
specific legislation regulating video surveillance.
B. Installation of "Cookies"
A "cookie" is a data file that is placed on a computer's hard drive when
the user visits a particular Web site.148 The cookie is used by the Web site to
develop and store information about the user, including usernames, prefer-
ences, browsing habits, and online purchases. These memory files facilitate
access to Web sites, allow for the use of targeted banner advertisements,
149
and enable features such as shopping carts.150 Once a user has accessed a
Web site that uses cookie technology or an affiliated site, the embedded
145 See, e.g., United States v. Bissell, 954 F. Supp. 841, 864-67 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 142 F.3d
429 (3d Cir. 1998). To investigate allegations that'a part owner of a gasoline service station was
defrauding a fellow investor, government officials, with the investor's permission, installed a
camera overlooking a desk area of the service station in a room that was readily accessible to
customers and visible through windows from the parking lot. Id. at 864. The camera videotaped
the defendant pocketing a substantial portion of the receipts before depositing the rest in com-
pany bank accounts. Id. The court held that the videotaping was not a search because defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area. Id. at 866; see also Marrs v. Marriot
Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Md. 1992). In Marrs, the court upheld an employer's use of a
camera to monitor one employee's desk drawer after the employee had complained that some-
one had tampered with its contents. Id. at 277. The camera captured the plaintiff, a coworker,
picking the lock. Id. The court held that the plaintiff had no "reasonable expectation of privacy
in an open office." Id. at 833; see also Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. County of
Sacramento, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 843-44 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that deputy sheriffs lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy against being videotaped in a jail office in which inmates'
property was stored, particularly because the office was accessible to other people, including
inmates).
146 See, e.g., Savo, supra note 11, at 174 (reporting that managers of the Sheraton Boston
Hotel secretly videotaped employees in their locker room, supposedly in an attempt to catch a
busboy suspected of selling cocaine; this invasion of privacy cost the hotel $200,000 in a settle-
ment agreement).
147 As noted previously in this Article, there is no federal legislation regulating video sur-
veillance, and only a few states have enacted such laws. See supra note 29.
148 Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Intuit Privacy
Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
149 See DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502. In DoubleClick, the court described the rent-
ing of advertising space on a Web site as follows:
Commercial Web sites often rent-out online advertising "space" to other Web sites.
In the simplest type of arrangement, the host Web site (e.g., Lycos.com) rents space
on its webpages to another Web site (e.g., TheGlobe.com) to place a "hotlink"
banner advertisement .... When a user on the host Web site "clicks" on the
banner advertisement, he is automatically connected to the advertiser's designated
Web site.
Id.
150 This is the electronic equivalent of a supermarket shopping cart when one is shopping
online-an electronic "place" to "store" various items the shopper has selected until, after the
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cookie on the hard drive begins collecting data about the user's Web
activities.
In four reported cases-Chance v. Avenue A, Inc.,151 In re Intuit Privacy
Litigation,152 In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation,153 and In re Pharma-
trak, Inc.,154 computer users have sued upon discovering that commercial
Web sites have installed cookies on their computers. The suits were based on
three federal statutes: the Wiretap Act, 155 the Stored Communications Act,
156
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA").
157
1. The Wiretap Act
In Chance, Intuit, and DoubleClick, the courts correctly rejected Wiretap
Act claims. In each case, the user communicated information to a commer-
cial Web site, which installed a cookie on the user's hard drive; the cookie
directed the user's computer to send the same information to a third party,
which compiled such information to develop user profiles. 58 In each case,
the court held that no unlawful interception had occurred because, even if
the transmission to the third party constituted an "interception" of the user's
communications with the Web site, this was done with the consent of the Web
site, which was a party to the communication. 159 Thus, the interception was
consensual under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), 160 and, because it was not con-
ducted for a tortious or illegal purpose, it was lawful.
161
In Pharmatrak, however, the companies maintaining the Web sites spe-
cifically instructed the third party not to collect information that would iden-
tify the user, but the third-party's cookie did so anyway.' 62 This action, the
court correctly held, was not protected by the consent exception in
§ 2511(2)(d), because the Web site companies had not consented to intercep-
tion of that information.
163
shopping expedition is complete, the shopper is ready to pay for all of his or her purchases. See
NEW'rON's TELECOM DICrIONARY, supra note 42, at 719.
151 Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
152 Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
153 DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502-03.
154 In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).
155 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000 & Supp. I 2001) (Wiretap Act).
156 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000 & Supp. I 2001) (Stored Communications Act).
157 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
158 Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156-57 (W.D. Wash. 2001);
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04; In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
159 Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1163; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519; Intuit, 138 F.
Supp. 2d at 1278.
160 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
161 Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1163; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519; Intuit, 138 F.
Supp. 2d at 1279.
162 In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2003).
163 Id. at 20-21. In Pharmatrak, several pharmaceutical companies invited users to visit
their Web sites to access information about their products and rebates. Id. at 12. Pharmatrak
collected information about the Internet users who visited the pharmaceutical companies' Web
sites and sold that information to the companies. Id. This information allowed each company to
track the Web pages a user viewed within a Web site, how long the user spent on each Web page,
the visitor's path through the site, including points of entry and exit, the visitor's IP address, and
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2. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The CFAA makes it a crime to access a computer without authorization
and states that whoever "intentionally accesses a computer without authori-
zation, or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . .information
from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign
communication .. .shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this
section." 164
The CFAA also creates a civil cause of action for the victim of such
unauthorized access.165 The statute permits such a suit, however, only if a
plaintiff suffers "damages" as defined in the statute. "IT]he term 'damage'
means any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a
system, or information that-(A) causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in
value during any 1-year period to one or more individuals ....
In DoubleClick and Chance, each court held that although plaintiffs
could combine as a class to achieve the minimum threshold of $5,000 dam-
ages or economic loss, they had to prove that a single act of unauthorized
access to a particular computer caused the plaintiffs to suffer an aggregate
loss that met the threshold. 167 Apparently, if a single act of unauthorized
access to a particular computer by the defendant cost each of 500 individuals
$10, this would meet the threshold; but if the defendant, in 10,000 separate
albeit identical acts, illicitly inserted a cookie on 10,000 separate computers,
causing each computer user $1, or $10, or $100, or $4,999, in damages or loss,
this would not meet the threshold.
In DoubleClick, the court also concluded that the damages asserted by
plaintiffs-the inconvenience and time required to delete the cookie, the eco-
nomic value of having plaintiffs view certain advertisements, and the value of
the Web page the user viewed immediately before arriving at the client's site (i.e., the "referrer
URL"). Id. at 13. Pharmatrak also enabled each company to compare the traffic on its Web site
to the traffic on the other companies' Web sites. Id. Pharmatrak accumulated the data by trans-
mitting a persistent cookie to the user's computer that allowed it to track the user's access to the
Web sites in question for ninety days. Id. at 13-14, 14 n.5. Users who visited the Web sites were
not informed of this. Id. at 13-14. Although the companies insisted that the process must not
collect any identifying data about who visited the Web sites, and Pharmatrak assured them that it
did not, in fact such information (including date of birth and medical condition) entered by a
small number of users who visited the Web sites was gathered. Id. at 15. The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit correctly held that such personal information qualifies as the "contents" of
an electronic communication under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and that
Pharmatrak "intercepted" such contents by acquiring the information contemporaneous with the
transmission of that information. Id. at 18-19.
164 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2), (a)(2)(C) (2000).
165 Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may
maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and
injunctive relief or other equitable relief. Damages for violations involving damage
as defined in subsection (e)(8)(A) are limited to economic damages.
Id. § 1030(g).
166 Id. § 1030(e)(8)(A). "Damages" can also be shown if the unauthorized access impairs
medical care, id. § 1030(e)(8)(B); causes physical injury, id. § 1030(e)(8)(C); or threatens public
health or safety, id. § 1030(e)(8)(D).
167 Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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the demographic data accumulated-did not have the requisite monetary
value.
1 68
3. Stored Communications Act
Three courts have considered whether installing a cookie on a com-
puter's hard drive, and accessing the information gathered thereby, consti-
tutes accessing a stored electronic communication in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(a). This statute states as follows:
(a) OFFENSE.-Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section
whoever-
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire
or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such
system shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
1 69
At issue in each case was whether the defendant's activities came within
an exception to § 2701(a) codified in § 2701(c):
(c) ExcEPTIoNs.-Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with
respect to conduct authorized-
(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communi-
cations service;
(2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or
intended for that user .... 170
In Intuit, a federal judge in California reached the emotionally satisfying
conclusion that installation of a cookie on a computer's hard drive did violate
the statute. 171 To do so, however, the court had to "rewrite" the statute. In
the other two decisions, DoubleClick and Chance, the courts, applying the
statute as written, concluded correctly, if disappointingly, that this conduct
does not violate the Stored Communications Act.172
a. DoubleClick and Chance
DoubleClick is the leading case and is, therefore, worth a more detailed
review than the other cases.
168 DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 524. The court refused to accept a monetary evaluation
for the inconvenience and time required to delete the cookie because the defendant had pro-
vided a reasonable method for a computer user to opt out of having a cookie implanted in the
first place. Id. at 524-25. It rejected the concept that the defendant's opportunity to present the
plaintiffs with advertising constituted economic damages or loss to plaintiffs. Id. at 525. Lastly,
"although demographic information is valued highly ... the value if its collection has never been
considered an economic loss to the subject." Id.
169 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
170 Id. § 2701(c)(1)-(2).
171 In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
172 Chance, 165 F. Supp. at 1162; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
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DoubleClick, Inc. "acts as an intermediary between host Web sites and
Web sites seeking to place banner advertisements" by placing a client Web
site's banner advertisement on the screens of viewers who match the client's
demographic target. 173 DoubleClick does so "by building detailed profiles of
Internet users and using them to target clients' advertisements."1 74
DoubleClick compiles the profiles by using its own technology to sift through
information it obtains from thousands of affiliated Web sites. 175 The only
information DoubleClick acquires is information that the user voluntarily
discloses to a DoubleClick-affiliated Web site.
176
The process begins when a computer user visits a Web site (e.g.,
"ABC.com") affiliated with DoubleClick. 177 To visit that Web site, the user's
computer automatically communicates certain information to the Web site.
78
The Web site installs a cookie on the user's hard drive, instructing the user's
computer to "send a communication automatically to DoubleClick's
server."'179 This communication includes the cookie number, the name of the
DoubleClick-affiliated Web site the user visited, the user's browser-type, and
a request that DoubleClick send advertisements to fill the blank spaces in the
ABC.com Web page.180 DoubleClick technology automatically evaluates all
of the information that has been accumulated about that user, 8 1 including
information obtained as a result of the user's prior visits to other
DoubleClick Web sites, and chooses the banner ads from other DoubleClick
clients that fit the user's profile. 182 DoubleClick also updates its profile of
that user by adding the fact that the user has visited the ABC.com Web
page.' 83 Likewise, the cookie collects information about anything the user
does while visiting the ABC.com Web site.184
The court stressed three "clearly defined parameters" that limited the
information the DoubleClick cookies collected. 85 First, the cookies only col-
lected information concerning the user's activities on DoubleClick-affiliated
Web sites.186 Second, there was no allegation that DoubleClick ever at-
tempted to obtain any information that the user did not voluntarily reveal to
a DoubleClick affiliate, or that DoubleClick attempted to access files, pro-
173 DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 503.
176 Id. at 504.




181 As the court in DoubleClick noted, the cookie collects data about the user's computer
and not about the user him or herself. Id. at 502 n.7. If several people use the same computer to
visit DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites, DoubleClick has no way of isolating which user happens
to be using the computer at any given time. Id. The converse is also true; "if one person uses
multiple computers, DoubleClick would be unable to identify and aggregate the person's activity
on different computers." Id.
182 Id. at 503--04.
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grams, or other information on users' hard drives. 187 Third, DoubleClick
provided users with an easy, no-cost way of preventing DoubleClick's
tracking.
188
Plaintiffs alleged that DoubleClick's placement of cookies on their com-
puters' hard drives constituted unauthorized access to stored communica-
tions on their computers and, therefore, violated 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) of the
Stored Communications Act. 189 The court rejected this claim, holding that
DoubleClick's activities fell within an exception in the statute set forth in
§ 2701(c)(2), exempting conduct authorized by a user of a wire or electronic
communications service "with respect to a communication of or intended for
that user."190 The court concluded that the DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites
were "users" of the Internet within the meaning of that term in
§ 2701(c)(2). 191  Because all the plaintiffs' communications with the
DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites accessed by DoubleClick's cookies were ei-
ther communications "of" those Web sites or communications "intended for"
those Web sites, and the Web sites authorized DoubleClick to access those
communications, DoubleClick's activities fell within the § 2701(c)(2)
exception.
192
Plaintiffs also argued that the information stored in the cookie on a com-
puter's hard drive (i.e., the identification number) was an electronic commu-
nication in "electronic storage" because they were never sent to or through
the Web sites.' 93 The court rejected this contention.194 First, even assuming
the cookie identification number installed on the plaintiff's hard drive was an
"electronic communication," it was not in "electronic storage," as that term is
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). 195 The statute defines "electronic storage"
as:
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic com-
munication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communica-
tion service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication .... 196
187 Id.
188 Id. at 504-05. As to the latter, the court noted that users had two options: "(1) visiting
the DoubleClick Web site and requesting an 'opt-out' cookie; and (2) configuring their browsers
to block any cookies from being deposited." Id.
189 Id. at 507.
190 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2000). This provision is the Stored Communications Act's
equivalent of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), the consensual interception provision of the Wiretap Act.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
191 DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09.
192 Id. at 513.
193 Id. at 511.
194 Id. at 511-13.
195 Id.
196 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000) (emphasis added). Section 2510 is the first section in the
Wiretap Act. See id. § 2510. The Stored Communications Act specifically imports the defini-
tions from the Wiretap Act. See id. § 2711(1) (2000) ("[T]he terms defined in section 2510
have .. .the definitions given such terms in that section .... ).
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The court correctly reasoned that a cookie did not qualify for statutory
protection under § 2510(17) because a user's hard drive was not an "elec-
tronic communication service."'197 The court also found that a cookie did not
qualify for statutory protection under § 2510(17)(A) because that provision
only protects a communication that was "temporarily stored by electronic
communications services incident to their transmission-for example, when
an email service stores a message until the addressee downloads it."'1 98 Thus,
the statute did not protect an electronic communication that was stored on
the recipient's hard drive after it had been received. 99 The court also found
that the cookie could not qualify under § 2510(17)(A) for another reason;
that provision protects only communications in "temporary" storage, while
the DoubleClick cookie remained on the user's hard drive for an indefinite
period of time.200 As the court stated, "[I]n plain language, 'indefinite' exis-
tence is the opposite of 'temporary,' and the DoubleClick cookie's residence
on plaintiffs' hard drives is certainly not an 'intermediate' step in their trans-
mission to another addressee. '20
Finally, the court held that even if a DoubleClick-installed cookie was a
stored electronic communication, it still fell within the § 2701(c)(2) excep-
tion, which exempts the act of accessing a stored communication "by a user
of that [wire or electronic communications] service with respect to a commu-
nication of or intended for that user" from the criminal provision.20 2 Thus,
DoubleClick's cookie was exempted because DoubleClick was a "user" of
the service, and the cookie (if it was a "stored communication") was intended
for itself.2
0 3
The facts in Chance are substantially identical to those in
DoubleClick.204 In Chance, Avenue A played the same intermediary role be-
tween the individual user and the commercial Web sites as DoubleClick. 20 5
The only factual difference was that Avenue A had a commercial agreement
197 DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
198 Id. at 512. The statute's specific use of the terms "temporary" and "intermediate"
makes it clear that the ECPA "only protects electronic communications stored 'for a limited
time' in the 'middle' of a transmission, i.e. when an electronic communication service tempora-
rily stores a communication while waiting to deliver it." Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. It takes only a slight twist of this reasoning to portray the court as holding that a
computer owner is not protected by a statute designed to safeguard against "temporary" intru-
sion because in this case the intrusion is permanent.
202 Id. at 513-14; see supra note 170 and accompanying text.
203 DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 513. As the court observed:
In every practical sense, the cookies' identification numbers are internal
DoubleClick communications-both "of" and "intended for" DoubleClick.
DoubleClick creates the cookies, assigns them identification numbers, and places
them on plaintiffs' hard drives. The cookies and their identification numbers are
vital to DoubleClick and meaningless to anyone else. In contrast, virtually all
plaintiffs are unaware that the cookies exist, that these cookies have identification
numbers, that DoubleClick accesses these identification numbers and that these
numbers are critical to DoubleClick's operations.
Id.
204 Chance v. Avenue A., Inc., .165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
205 Id. at 1156-57.
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with DoubleClick that allowed Avenue A to supply DoubleClick-affiliated
Web sites with advertising even if those Web sites had no affiliation with
Avenue A. 206 As the court in Chance noted:
Although this is a significant factual difference from DoubleClick, it
leads to the identical legal conclusion. DoubleClick still has the
necessary authorization from the web site to escape liability under
§ 2701(c)(2) and the rerouting is irrelevant after that initial authori-
zation. The statute only addresses the entity that "accesses" the
communication, not any party to which the authorized accessor de-
cides to route it, such as Avenue A in this case. Because the web
site has in all cases authorized either Avenue A or DoubleClick to
access the communication between the computer user and the web
site, the § 2701(c)(2) exception applies, and the end result of no lia-
bility is the same.
20 7
Although the judge in Chance differed somewhat on the question of
whether the user's computer could be considered a "facility" as that term is
used in § 2701(a),208 the result was the same: the defendant was protected by
the exception in § 2701(c)(2) and, therefore, was entitled to a directed
verdict.
209
206 Id. at 1157.
207 Id. at 1161.
208 "[I]t is possible to conclude that modem computers, which serve as a conduit for the
web server's communication to Avenue A, are facilities covered under the Act." Id. at 1161; see
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09.
209 Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1162; see DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (holding that
"all plaintiff's communications accessed by DoubleClick fall under § 2701(c)(2)'s exception ...
and, accordingly, are not actionable," and that plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed). Conceding
"this rather strained interpretation of a 'facility through which an electronic communication ser-
vice is provided,"' the Chance court held, did not avail the plaintiffs; the commercial Web sites
that the user visits are "users" of the "electronic communication service." Chance, 165 F. Supp.
2d at 1161.
It naturally follows that any communication between the individual computer and
the web site is a communication "of or intended for" that user... [and if] web sites
are "users" and the communications allegedly accessed by Avenue A are "of or
intended for them," the § 2701(c)(2) exception only requires that the web site "au-
thorize" Avenue A's conduct.
Id. The court found that this fact, too, was clearly established. Id.
Any web site for which Avenue A provides advertisements must have written the
programming code required to direct Plaintiffs' computers to Avenue A's server.
Given the technological and commercial relationship between web sites and Ave-
nue A, it is implausible to suggest that any such "access" by Avenue A was not
intended or authorized by the web site. In fact, the opposite conclusion is ines-
capable: the very raison d'etre of Avenue A is to provide web sites with targeted
advertising, and it cannot do so without the collaboration and consent of those
sites.
Id. (citing DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 509).
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b. Intuit
By contrast, the court in Intuit concluded that the type of cookie under
discussion did in fact violate the Stored Communications Act. 210 It did so by
the simple expedient of rewriting the statute to support that conclusion:
Section 2701 does not require, nor has any court ever interpreted it
to require, that a defendant accused of violating Section 2701 be a
third-party to an electronic communication which eventually may
be in electronic storage in a facility. More specifically, Section 2701
does not require that there be a "communication" at all, i.e. the exis-
tence or absence of communication is irrelevant. The primary act
required for violation of Section 2701 is the act of accessing elec-
tronically stored data.
211
The court could reach this remarkable conclusion only by ignoring the
title of the statute, the title of the specific provision in question, and its con-
tents. The statute is under the heading "Stored Wire and Electronic Commu-
nications and Transactional Records Access. 2 12 Section 2701 is entitled
"Unlawful access to stored communications.2 13 The provision makes it a
crime if someone "intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided" or "inten-
tionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility ... and thereby ob-
tains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system. '2 14 To read
this to mean that § 2701 "does not require that there be a 'communication' at
all" and that the statute's primary focus "is the act of accessing electronically
stored data" is a truly remarkable example of judicial Humpty Dumptyism.
215
The court went on in a footnote: "Hereinafter, the court uses the term
'data' interchangeably with the statutory term 'electronic communica-
tion.'" 21 6 But the Stored Communications Act, which the court was purport-
edly applying, does not consider "data" and "communication" to be
"interchangeable." The statute defines "electronic communication" as "any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
210 In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275-76 (C.D. Cal 2001).
211 Id. at 1275-76 (emphasis added). The court continued: "For example a hypothetical
'hacker' who accesses data in a computer without the owner's knowledge would be guilty of
violating Section 2701 even though the hacker had no 'communication' with the storing agency,
i.e. the hacker is not a 'third-party' to a communication." Id. As is spelled out below, this is
simply a gross misreading of the statute.
212 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000) (Stored Communications Act) (emphasis added).
213 Id. § 2701 (emphasis added).
214 Id. § 2701(a) (emphasis added).
215 "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 238 (Gros-
set & Dunlap 1996) (1872).
216 Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 n.4.
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photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign com-
merce," with exceptions not germane to the current discussion.2 17
This definition confirms what was already plain and obvious. A statute
entitled "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications" regulates access to
stored wire and electronic communications and not to stored data generally.
c. Evaluation
DoubleClick and Chance interpreted § 2701 correctly. This conclusion is
supported by the plain language of the statute (to the extent that any clause
in any provision of any federal statute dealing with electronic surveillance
can be said to have a "plain" meaning) and by its legislative history.2 18 Addi-
tional support for the DoubleClick interpretation is the implication of the
contrary holding. If Intuit is good law, then each use of commercial cookies
is a federal felony.
219
And yet, the result of a correct reading of the statute is appalling. A
statute designed to protect the privacy of an individual's use of his or her
computer winds up protecting the right of a commercial enterprise to install a
program into a person's computer; to use that program to gather information
about the users of that computer; to compile a profile of those users; and to
enable businesses to target specific advertisements at the users with that in-
formation. All of this legally can take place without the computer user's in-
formed consent.
The result is directly attributable to the relative antiquity of the Stored
Communications Act, which is now a bit more than eighteen years old-ade-
quate perhaps for the technology of 1986 but as antiquated today as, say,
legislation enacted in the 1920s regulating the manufacture and operation of
automobiles.
220
The threat to privacy posed by cookies is not particularly egregious. But
the idea that an advertising company can install an electronic bug on my
home or office computer and accumulate information about me, assemble a
profile of my buying habits (which may or may not be accurate), 221 and in
217 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000) (emphasis added). For a discussion on the relationship of
the definitions to the Stored Communications Act, see supra note 196.
218 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(discussing the text of the statute and its legislative history as support for the proposition that
"Congress' intent was to protect communications held in interim storage by electronic communi-
cation service providers").
219 In DoubleClick, the court commented:
[I]f § 2510(17) were interpreted in the manner plaintiffs advocate, Web sites would
commit federal felonies every time they accessed cookies on users' hard drives,
regardless of whether those cookies contained any sensitive information. This ex-
pansive reading of a criminal statute runs contrary to the canons of statutory inter-
pretation and Congress' evident intent.
Id. at 512-13.
220 "Although the Act was intended to cover such mid-1980s technological facilities as tele-
phone companies, email servers, and bulletin boards, modern technology has placed the personal
computer at a focal point of Internet communications." Chance v. Avenue A., Inc., 165 F. Supp.
2d 1153, 1160 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
221 See supra note 181. Even if I am the only person using the computer, my cookie "pro-
file" may be grossly inaccurate. For example, if I went online to buy a canned ham as a gift for a
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essence "rent out" that profile to advertisers, all without my knowledge or
consent, and without any legal remedy or recourse,222 is infuriating.
I am not arguing that cookies should be outlawed. People have the right
to share information about themselves with commercial enterprises. Indeed,
some consumers might appreciate the convenience that may follow when
merchants have a clearer idea of what kinds of goods and services are likely
to interest them. But this should be a matter of choice, not stealth. Legisla-
tion should be enacted requiring companies like DoubleClick and its affili-
ates to explain, in plain language, what kinds of information it will acquire,
how it will acquire the information, how it will use the information, and with
whom it will share it. Such companies should be required, also, to provide a
user-friendly opt-out option or, even better, to collect information only on
computer users who affirmatively opt in. 223 These requirements would give
each user the ability to make an informed choice about whether or not to
consent to the accumulation of a user profile. It would also provide a firm
basis on which to claim damages if a cookie installer exceeds the limits
spelled out in the notice.
C. "Shopper Discount" or "Bonus" Cards
Anyone who has ever shopped in a supermarket knows that some per-
centage of the store's wares are almost always specially priced because the
manufacturer is seeking to entice new consumers, the store overstocked cer-
tain items, or the store wants a loss-leader. In the past few years, however,
more and more stores make these bargains available only to customers who
have store "shopper discount" or "bonus" cards. Some pharmacy chains
have begun instituting the same practice. The store compiles a profile of
purchases made with the card number, which is used to target the named
card holders with specific ads and discount coupons. (The enrollment or ap-
plication forms permit the customer to opt out of receiving such mailings.)
Some stores also award periodic "bonus points" that entitle the customer to
additional discounts.
This sounds fairly benign until you consider that using such a card per-
mits the store to keep a detailed record of each transaction the customer
makes: the date, store location, time, and items purchased, including not only
food and drink but also over-the-counter health products-birth control
products, pregnancy test kits, and various other items that suggest a great
deal about a customer's physical and emotional condition and intimate be-
havior. If the store is also a pharmacy, the profile may also include prescrip-
Christian friend, a couple of romance novels for my aunt, and a kung fu movie for my nephew,
the ads the cookie would send me would probably be a bit off, given that I keep kosher, do not
read bodice rippers, and have no idea which end of a chukka-stick is supposed to stir the soup.
222 But see Michael R. Siebecker, Cookies and the Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers
Trespassing on Our Computers?, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 893 (2003) (arguing that insertion of cookies
into computers constitutes the common law tort of trespass to chattels).
223 DoubleClick, in fact, agreed to a procedure much along these lines when it settled a suit
brought by several state attorneys general. Press Release, DoubleClick, Attorneys General End
Investigation into DoubleClick's Ad Serving Practices (Aug. 26, 2002); Stephanie Miles,
DoubleClick Settles Investigation, WALL. ST. J. (Europe), Aug. 28, 2002, at A6.
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tions filled at the store.224 Marketers are smugly delighted at how easy it has
been to get customers to provide such information.
225
In researching this Article, I obtained three application forms: one from
Giant Foods (which in some states does business as "Super-G"), one from
Safeway (both Giant and Safeway are multistate supermarket chains), and
one from CVS Pharmacy. Each form has a space for the applicant to provide
his or her name, address, home phone number, 22 6 and e-mail address. 227 The
Safeway and CVS forms contain space for the applicant's date of birth; Giant
does not. None requests the applicant's social security number. 228 Directly
above where the applicant is to sign, each contains a statement explaining
how the information will be used and assuring the applicant that the informa-
tion gathered will not be sold or leased. Presumably a disclosure in violation
of this agreement would subject the store to a suit for breach of contract.
224 The CVS/pharmacy ExtraCare enrollment form privacy agreement states in pertinent
part, "As an extra service to our valued customers, we can send you offers and information that
are customized based on your prescription and non-prescription purchases." See infra note 229.
By contrast, the Giant Foods privacy statement on its Web site states in bold-face type:
This privacy policy does not include Giant/Super G pharmacy records. Pharmacy
records are kept separate from other Customer Information and maintained in ac-
cordance with the privacy and other requirements of Federal and state law. Please
speak to your pharmacist for additional information.
GIANT, GIANT PRIVACY STATEMENT, at http://www.giantfood.com/Privacy.htm (last modified
July 11, 2003).
225 See Katherine Albrecht, Supermarket Cards: The Tip of the Retail Surveillance Iceberg,
79 DENY. U. L. REV. 534, 536 (2002) (quoting statements from a trade publication and an indus-
try executive). The article is unabashedly an advocacy piece. Albrecht describes herself in the
author profile:
Katherine Albrecht is the founder and director of Consumers Against Supermarket
Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN), a national grass-roots consumer
group dedicated to fighting supermarket "loyalty" or frequent shopper cards. CAS-
PIAN's efforts are dedicated to educating consumers, condemning marketing prac-
tices that invade customers' privacy, and encouraging privacy-conscious shopping
habits across the retail spectrum. Formed in 1999, CASPIAN has since reached
millions of American consumers with its pro-privacy message.
Id. at 565.
226 The home phone number is used as an alternate identification device in case the cus-
tomer forgets his or her card. It is worth noting, however, that the federal "do not call" legisla-
tion, see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text, exempts from the telemarketing ban
companies with which the telephone subscriber has done business in the past eighteen months.
See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii) (2004) (exempting seller who has an "established business
relationship" with the target of the call); 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(n) (defining "established business
relationship" as "a relationship between a seller and a consumer based on" a business transac-
tion between the seller and the consumer taking place within the eighteen months preceding the
date of the telemarketing call). Thus, applying for a card exempts the store from telemarketing
restrictions and frees the store or its parent company to make telemarketing calls to the card-
holder's home phone.
227 Friends who have obtained such cards tell me that stores do not insist that e-mail ad-
dresses be provided, although the application does not inform the applicant of this.
228 A different section of the Safeway form can be used to apply for a Safety Smartcheck
card; that section does ask for the applicant's social security number. See SAFEWAY, SAFEWAY
CLUB CARD APPLICATION, available at http://www.safeway.com/app.pdf (last visited August 12,
2004).
The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 72:1503
Still, there are differences in the three privacy provisions. The CVS
statement unequivocally states that it "NEVER" gives or sells "any specific
information about you to any manufacturers or direct marketers. '229 The
Safeway Club Card Customer Agreement Statement, by contrast, reads, in per-
tinent part, as follows: "We respect your privacy. Safeway does not sell or
lease personally identifying information (i.e., your name, address, telephone
number, and bank and credit card numbers) to non-affiliated companies or
entities.'"230
An attempt to learn the identities of "affiliated companies" was
unavailing.
231
Giant's Privacy Statement provides the greatest detail of the three as to
how the company will acquire information, to whom it will disclose it (it, too,
states that information may be disclosed to affiliated companies, without
naming them), and the circumstances. It is, for example, the only one of the
229 CVS/PHARMACY, CVS/PHARMACY EXTRACARE CARD ENROLLMENT FORM, available at
https://www.cvs.com/CVSApp/cvs/gateway/registerextracare?LOGINMSG=XFRACAREMSG
(last visited August 12, 2004). The CVS/pharmacy ExtraCare Card enrollment form privacy
statement is as follows:
PRIVACY AGREEMENT As an extra service to our valued customers, we can
send you offers and information that are customized based on your prescription
and non-prescription purchases. We may at times use an outside processing com-
pany as CVS's agent to help print and send mailings; beyond your name and ad-
dress, these agents do not receive any personal information and are bound to strict
confidentiality. We value your privacy and NEVER give or sell any specific infor-
mation about you to any manufacturers or direct marketers.
Id.
230 SAFEWAY, supra note 228. The Safeway Club Card Customer Agreement Statement
reads as follows:
We respect your privacy. Safeway does not sell or lease personally identifying in-
formation (i.e., your name, address, telephone number, and bank and credit card
account numbers) to non-affiliated companies or entities. We do record informa-
tion regarding the purchases made with your Safeway Club Card to help us provide
you with special offers and other information. Safeway also may use this informa-
tion to provide you with personally tailored coupons, offers or other information
that may be provided to Safeway by other companies. If you do not wish to receive
personally tailored coupons, offers or other information, please check the box be-
low. Must be at least 18 years of age.
Id.
231 On December 10, 2003, I called the regional Safeway office for the Maryland suburbs of
Washington, D.C. The recording directed that for any inquires about the Club Card program, I
should dial, toll-free, 1-877-723-3929. The recording at that number directed that, to enable the
company to "access your account more fully," I should enter either my Club Card number or my
phone number. I did nothing. After a pause, the automated system responded, "I'm sorry, I did
not recognize that number." I entered my office phone number. Same response. I entered my
cell phone number. Same response. In other words, unless you are a "member" already, no
apparent means are offered to get past the machine to ask questions about the program. On my
fourth try, when asked for my card or phone number, I entered "0"-not an option given by the
recording. After a brief musical interlude-as it happened, Billy Joel's recording You May Be
Right (I May Be Crazy)-I spoke to "Helen," who told me she is located in Phoenix. When I
asked her the identity of "affiliated" companies, she said she "imagined" that they would only
share the information with other Safeway stores. I asked who could give me a more precise
answer. After another reasonably short interlude on hold, Helen said she would send an e-mail
to corporate headquarters in California asking someone there to call or write to me. Is anyone
surprised to learn that no one ever got back to me?
1544
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three to mention that the information could be subpoenaed. Giant's state-
ment invites those seeking additional information to visit its Web site.
232
The question of "affiliated companies" aside, the privacy statements are
reasonably reassuring on their face. But there may be much less to privacy
promises than meets the eye. Consider again the Safeway promise: "Safeway
does not sell or lease personally identifying information (i.e., your name, ad-
dress, telephone number, and bank and credit card numbers) to non-affiliated
companies or entities. '233 According to an activist who seeks to warn con-
sumers against using such cards, even if companies delete such "personally
identifying information" from customer profiles before those profiles are
shared or sold, "[a] computer process called 'reidentification' can allow mar-
keters to re-attach names and addresses to 'anonymous' records" quite easily
by combining the remaining information with information available from
other databases. 234 And even if the store shares the information with no one,
incidents have occurred where companies do so accidentally, or corrupt em-
ployees sell the information illicitly.235 Moreover, the privacy agreements do
not preclude the store from combining its own profile of a customer with the
vast amounts of other information likely to be available about most people
from various databases. 236
Nor does the privacy policy preclude the store from using its information
against a customer if a dispute arises between the two, as allegedly happened
in one case. 237 A private litigant may subpoena such information.2 38 Other
232 GIANT FOODS, INC., GIANT BONUSCARD APPLICATION AND CHANGE FORM, Form
810120 (2003). The application form contains the following:
We will not disclose customer names, home or e-mail addresses, or phone numbers
to any company, other than those affiliated with Giant, without your permission.
We may provide information to unaffiliated companies who perform a service on
our behalf, such as mail houses who process mailings for us. In such cases, our
vendors sign a strict confidentiality agreement and cannot use this information for
any other purpose. Giant may disclose customer identifiable information as re-
quired by law in response to a subpoena or court order.
Purchases made with your BonusCard will be automatically recorded. The Bonus-
Card is our primary means of collecting information that helps us to target benefits
and services to our customers. For your protection, Giant has developed a set of
privacy policies for the use and handling of this data. (For detailed information,
visit our website at www.giantfood.com).
One of the most exciting aspects of this program is the opportunity to provide of-
fers targeted to specific customer needs. This means we can provide baby offers to
families with babies, and pet offers to families with pets.
Id. The form offers an "opt out" box for "[c]ustomers who do not want to receive targeted offers
in the mail," with the caveat that selecting that option leaves the customer ineligible for the
company's electronic sweepstakes program. Id.
233 SAFEWAY, supra note 228.
234 Albrecht, supra note 225, at 536-37, 565 (reporting that most people can be reidentified
merely by combining zip code and date of birth). Although the Safeway form promises not to
reveal a customer's name, address, phone number, or bank and credit card numbers, it does not
promise to withhold a customer's date of birth from those to whom it sells or leases the data.
SAFEWAY, supra note 228.
235 Albrecht, supra note 225, at 537.
236 Id.
237 A shopper sued a supermarket, claiming he slipped on a yogurt spill in the store and
fractured his kneecap. Id. A mediator allegedly told the plaintiff's attorney that the store
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grim possibilities for use of such information include a supermarket chain
sharing customer purchase records with health insurance companies, which
might then refuse to cover the customer or restrict coverage for certain con-
ditions;239 use of such information by the Internal Revenue Service 24° or
prosecutors; 241 and store use of driver's licenses or biometrically secure iden-
tification techniques to prevent shoppers from falsely identifying themselves
when they obtain or use the card.
242
At least two states have enacted legislation prohibiting stores from re-
quiring customers to disclose certain information to obtain such cards and





"Ethical journalism" has always been a somewhat fluid concept. 2" The
willingness of mainstream media companies to use surveillance technology to
intrude upon individual privacy in pursuit of a story is not a twenty-first cen-
tury phenomenon. 245 In the past several years, however, restraints on what is
planned to introduce the plaintiff's liquor purchase records at trial to paint him as an alcoholic.
Id.
238 Id. (relating that in a divorce action, the wife used the husband's supermarket card
records indicating purchases of expensive wine as a basis to argue that he could afford to pay
more alimony than he claimed he could pay). Of the three membership applications I examined,
only the Giant BonusCard application mentions that the information is subject to subpoena. See
GIANT, supra note 232.
239 Albrecht, supra note 225, at 538.
240 Id. at 539 (reporting that such practices are already used by British tax enforcement
authorities "to investigate whether shoppers' spending habits match the lifestyles indicated by
their tax returns").
241 Id. (relating an incident in which Drug Enforcement Agency agents obtained supermar-
ket card data of individuals in Arizona who had purchased large quantities of plastic bags, which
are often used to package illicit drugs, as well as more benign substances (such as brownies for a
bake sale)).
242 Id. at 558-59.
243 CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1749.61-66 (West 2000) (prohibiting stores from requiring driver's
license or social security numbers to obtain a discount card and prohibiting stores from selling or
sharing cardholders' personal information); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-371 (2003). For an analysis
and critique of these provisions, see Allison Kidd, Note, A Penny Saved, A Lifetime Learned?
The California and Connecticut Approaches to Supermarket Privacy, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 143
(2002).
244 The same can probably said of the ethical standards of many professions, including the
legal profession.
245 See, e.g., Quentin Burrows, Note, Scowl Because You're on Candid Camera: Privacy and
Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1107-08 (1997) (noting the regularity with which
"camera crews follow police and emergency personnel as well as use video surveillance cameras
mounted on poles and buildings"); Howard Kurtz, Hidden Network Cameras: A Troubling
Trend? Critics Complain of Deception as Dramatic Footage Yields High Ratings, WASH. POST,
Nov. 30, 1992, at Al. For example, Group W Productions did a television story about a traffic
accident and the resulting rescue operation, including footage of plaintiffs' extrication from the
wreck and conversations between plaintiffs and members of the rescue crew. Shulman v. Group
W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475-76 (Cal. 1998). The court held that aspects of the situation that
could be seen and heard by passers-by and onlookers were newsworthy and not protected by any
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(to borrow a phrase) "fit to print" or broadcast have pretty much dis-
integrated.246 The decline might have begun when Senator Gary Hart chal-
lenged reporters to catch him in adultery if they could, and, taking up the
challenge, they did.247 The antics of Bill Clinton as governor and president,
and the equally offensive extremes to which his political enemies went in
their attempt to destroy him, gave the media the perfect excuse to abandon
whatever limitations remained.
248
Consider, for example, Monica Lewinsky's infamous blue dress from
The Gap. The passage of time has perhaps permitted us to forget some of the
details we never cared to know, but it is worth reviewing how the existence of
the damning evidence first became public. On January 21, 1998, gossip and
sleazemonger Matt Drudge first reported on his Internet Drudge Report that
Lewinsky possessed a "black cocktail dress" with presidential DNA on it.249
Responsible institutions in the mainstream media presumably had heard sim-
ilar rumors but had not published them because they had not been properly
sourced. Yet, the next day, NBC's Today show interviewed Drudge, who re-
peated the story while admitting that he had no confirmation besides his sin-
gle source. 250 Once The Today Show "broke" the story, a typical media
feeding frenzy took place, each mainstream media outlet striving to outdo
the others. 251 On Friday evening, January 23, ABC's World News Tonight
right to privacy. See id. at 490-91. Other items shown or played, however, were actionable. See
id. The nurse who participated in extricating plaintiffs from their car wore a microphone to
enable the corporate defendant to tape her conversations with one plaintiff. Id. at 475. Regard-
less of whether the cameraman could have heard this conversation with his unaided ear, the
court held, it was a triable issue whether, by persuading the nurse to wear the microphone, the
cameraman listened in on a conversation that plaintiff could reasonably have expected to be
private. Id. at 491. Moreover, after they were extricated, a cameraman accompanied the victims
in the helicopter to the hospital. Id. The court stated that "we are aware of no law or custom
permitting the press to ide in ambulances or enter hospital rooms during treatment without the
patient's consent." Id. at 490; see also Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999)
(holding that a worker for a telepsychic marketing company, whose employees gave psychic
readings to customers over the telephone, had a cause of action for tortious intrusion because a
television news reporter, working undercover as an employee with the same company, had co-
vertly recorded her conversations with the plaintiff by wearing a small video camera in her hat
and a microphone in her bra).
246 I am modifying the slogan that appears as the upper left hand slug on the front page of
the New York Times: "All the News That's Fit to Print."
247 See Jim Savage, Gary Hart Affair Turned Spotlight on Paper, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 15,
2002, at 9MH (reporting how the author and another reporter "broke" the story of Senator
Hart's dalliance with Donna Rice). Savage notes the coincidence that the Miami Herald's story
"was published on the same Sunday that The New York Times published a story that contained
Hart's denial of womanizing allegations and his famous challenge to the press to 'follow me
around[,] ... it will be boring."' Id. That statement can indeed be found in The New York Times
Magazine profile of Hart. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Gary Hart: The Elusive Front Runner, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 37 ("'Follow me around. I don't care,' he says firmly,
about the womanizing question. 'I'm serious. If anybody wants to put a tail on me, go ahead.
They'd be very bored."').
248 For a description of these excesses, see McClurg, supra note 67, at 1010-13.
249 Adam Cohen, The Press and the Dress, TIME, Feb. 16, 1998, at 52.
250 Id.
251 See generally id.
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was the first mainstream news outlet to report the story based on its own
sources, rather than on Drudge's story.252
That the media competes to publish salacious details about people who
become "news" is nothing new,2 53 but the "Drudgification" of journalism-
the fact that it is now "news" that someone with little credibility publishes a
rumor on the Internet-demonstrates the danger the media pose to the pri-
vacy of those who fall into its maw.
B. Bartnicki v. Vopper
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, con-
siderably increased the media's destructive power when it held that the me-
dia are immune from civil damages suits brought under 18 U.S.C.
252 Id.; Lawrence K. Grossman, Spot News: The Press and the Dress, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 34, 34. In all candor, gentle readers, I must confess to a personal
resentment about all this. That week in January, the red-hot story was that Monica Lewinsky
had called her friend Linda Tripp numerous times in the preceding months describing her en-
counters with President Clinton, and that Tripp had taped many of those conversations. On the
morning of January 22, I was interviewed by ABC-TV News about the legality of taping tele-
phone conversations and the admissibility of such evidence at trial at their downtown Washing-
ton studio. I was clear, I was concise, I was witty; in short, I was brilliant, and the producer told
me that the interview would be prominently featured on that night's show.
I drove back to the law school, where I immediately e-mailed my faculty colleagues, my
friends and relatives, and my synagogue listserv about my impending media stardom. Some time
between my interview and air time, however, someone at ABC decided that the hot story, to
which about fifteen minutes of the show was devoted, was about rumors-mere rumors!-about
the dress. Thus, my five minutes of fame gave way to a rumor of presidential proportions.
253 The most dramatic examples involve media coverage of criminal, and occasionally civil,
litigation. For a short overview of previous trials which also became media circuses, see Laurie
L. Levinson, Cases of the Century, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 585, 587-92 (2000), briefly discussing,
among others, the trials of Ted Kaczynski (the "Unabomber"), Harry Thaw (for the 1907 murder
of architect Sanford White), the McNamara brothers (for terrorist bombs that killed numerous
people in Los Angeles in 1910), Sacco and Venzetti, Bruno Richard Hauptmann (for kidnapping
and killing Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh's baby), the Nuremberg War Crime trials of
1945 to 1946, O.J. Simpson, the trial in 1911 arising out of the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire
(where wholesale violation of safety regulations resulted in the death of more than a hundred
employees when a fire broke out in its factory), the Scopes "monkey" trial of 1925, the 1975 to
1976 robbery trial of Patty Hearst (the newspaper heiress who in 1974 was kidnapped by a radi-
cal group and then joined her abductors in the commission of several crimes), the Scottsboro
rape trials of 1931, the rape trial of William Kennedy Smith, the securities fraud trial of Charles
Keating, and the assault trials arising from the beating of Rodney King. Subsequent articles in
the issue cover specific trials or trial lawyers in greater depth. See generally id. See also THE
PRESS ON TRIAL-CRIMES AND TRIALS AS MEDIA EVENTS (Lloyd Chiasson, Jr., ed., 1991) (in-
cluding chapters on the 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger; the 1770 trial arising out of the Boston
Massacre, in which, by the way, John Adams defended the British soldiers charged with murder;
the 1859 trial of John Brown; the Haymarket Riot trial of 1886; the trial of Lizzie Borden in 1893
for chopping up her parents; the Harry Thaw murder trial; the case of the Chicago "Black Sox,"
who were accused of fixing the 1921 World Series; the Scopes, Scottsboro, and Hauptmann trials;
the espionage trials of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs; the 1969 "Chicago Seven" trial arising out
of protests against the Vietnam War; the Charles Manson murder trial; the trial of Lt. William
Calley for the murder of Vietnamese civilians; and the O.J. Simpson case).
Some media organizations, it should be noted, occasionally refuse to participate in salacious
reporting. See, e.g., Tracey, supra note 62 (relating that one Colorado newspaper has announced
it will not cover frivolous details of the trial of L.A. Lakers basketball star Kobe Bryant for
rape).
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§ 2511(1)(c) of the Wiretap Act.254 The Court held that the media may pub-
lish or broadcast with impunity the contents of intercepted communications
that they know or have reason to know were unlawfully intercepted, so long
as the media company that published or broadcasted the communication did
not participate in the unlawful interception and the contents of the communi-
cation were of "public interest. '255 A concurring opinion signed by two
members of the six-justice majority opinion offered some hope that the dam-
age may be limited. 256 Nevertheless, the decision has ominous implications
for anyone in public life or anyone who becomes embroiled in a publicized
controversy. Although the decision does not directly involve the Internet,
those implications, when combined with the way the Internet and more tradi-
tional arms of the media interact, merit discussion here.
Bartnicki arose out of a situation that comes to every community from
time to time, a wage dispute between county school officials and the teachers
union.257 During the dispute, Kane, the president of the union, vented his
frustration in a phone conversation with Bartnicki, the union's chief negotia-
tor, by suggesting that they "blow off the front porches" of some school
board members.258 Someone, identity unknown, intercepted the call.
259
Eventually the union won a favorable tentative agreement. 260 Well after the
strike had been settled, and some four months after the phone conversation,
someone anonymously delivered the tape to a community activist who op-
posed the union's demands. 261 The activist gave copies of the tape to two
local radio stations, which played excerpts on the air.262 Television stations
and newspapers picked up the story thereafter.
263
254 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
255 Id.
256 Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
257 Id. at 518.
258 Id. at 518-19.
259 Id. at 518. Bartnicki used a cellular phone; Kane presumably used a hard-wired phone.
Id. The call probably was intercepted at random by someone using a scanner equipped to scan
the frequencies at which cellular calls are transmitted. See supra note 103. Such scanners cannot
target a particular cell phone, because a cellular phone does not have a particular frequency
dedicated to it. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 9 (1986) (explaining cellular telephone services opera-
tion). Rather, the cell phone company switching station computer randomly assigns a frequency
to each call it receives. Id. If the cell phone moves from one cell to another during the call, the
call is automatically handed from one switching station to the next, and each switching station
randomly assigns a new frequency to it. Id. The other possibility is that someone unlawfully
tapped Kane's hard-wired phone. However the call was intercepted, the interception was unlaw-
ful under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).
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The union officials sued the activist and radio stations264 under 18 U.S.C
§ 2520,265 alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c), which provides:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who-
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was ob-
tained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication in violation of this subsection;
(4) shall be fined under this article or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
266
Defendants moved for summary judgment on First Amendment
grounds.267 The trial judge denied the motion but certified the First Amend-
ment issue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.268 The govern-
ment intervened to defend the statute. 269 The Third Circuit reversed,
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment
issues.270 The Supreme Court, dividing six to three, held that the First
Amendment precluded imposition of civil damages for the disclosure because
the tape recording containing information of (supposed) 271 public signifi-
cance and the defendants (two radio stations, their reporter, and the activist
who gave the tape recording to the radio stations) played no role, direct or
indirect, in the unlawful interception.272
The decision has been analyzed extensively,273 so I offer only a brief
overview here. The majority acknowledged that the Wiretap Act provision
264 Presumably no suit was brought against the television stations and newspapers that re-
ported the matter thereafter because, once it was aired on the radio, any privacy interests the
speakers had in the conversation were already destroyed. Commenting on 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511(1)(c) and (d), the Senate Judiciary Committee stated, "The disclosure of the contents of
an intercepted communication that had already become 'public information' or 'common knowl-
edge' would not be prohibited." S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 93 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N 2112, 2181.
265 18 U.S.C. § 2520. Recovery of civil damages authorized
(a) IN GENERAL.-[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a
civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United States, which
engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (Supp. 1 2001). Relief may include a preliminary injunction, other equitable
or declaratory relief; actual, punitive, or liquidated damages; and reasonable attorneys' fees and
other litigation costs. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b) (2000). For a detailed discussion of civil actions based
on this provision, see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 29, §§ 4:31-:40.
266 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1), (4).
267 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 520.
268 Id. at 521.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 522.
271 As explained briefly below, I do not believe there was any public significance to the
contents of the tape.
272 Id. at 525.
273 See, e.g, Daniel P. Paradis, Comment, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Cell Phones and Throwing
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was content-neutral, as applied to defendants, but held that it nevertheless
constituted "a regulation of pure speech." 274 Thus, the provision was subject
to the general rules that "state action to punish the publication of truthful
information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards, '275 and that "if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public sig-
nificance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of
the information, absent a need ... of the highest order.
'276
The government argued that the statute served two interests: "[Fjirst,
the interest in removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversa-
tions, and second, the interest in minimizing the harm to persons whose con-
versations have been illegally intercepted. '277 The Court dismissed the first
as speculative and unsupported by empirical data.278
The majority acknowledged, however, that the government's second in-
terest, minimizing the harm to the victims of illegal interception, "is consider-
ably stronger" than the first asserted interest,279 that "the disclosure of the
contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy
than the interception itself, '280 and that "the fear of public disclosure of pri-
vate conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech.
'281
But "privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in pub-
lishing matters of public importance. '282 Such was the situation, the majority
concluded, in the case at hand.283 The Supreme Court stated: "The months of
negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers at the Wyo-
ming Valley West High School were unquestionably a matter of public con-
Stones, 37 NEw. ENG. L. REV. 1117 (2003); Jennifer Nichole Hunt, Note, Bartnicki v. Vopper:
Another Media Victory or Ominous Warning of a Potential Change in Supreme Court First
Amendment Jurisprudence?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 367 (2003). A somewhat more detailed version of
my own analysis and criticism of the decision may be found in FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra
note 29, § 4:12.1.
274 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526.
275 Id. at 527 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)). Although
Bartnicki was a civil suit brought by a private litigant, the case indirectly involved "state action"
because it was a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c), that created the cause of action.
276 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
277 Id. at 529.
278 Id. at 530-32. The Court concluded:
Although this suit demonstrates that there may be an occasional situation in which
an anonymous scanner will risk criminal prosecution by passing on information
without any expectation of financial reward or public praise, surely this is the ex-
ceptional case. Moreover, there is no basis for assuming that imposing sanctions
upon respondents will deter the unidentified scanner from continuing to engage in
surreptitious interceptions. Unusual cases fall far short of a showing that there is a
"need ... of the highest order" for a rule supplementing the traditional means of
deterring antisocial conduct. The justification for any such novel burden on expres-
sion must be far stronger than mere speculation about serious harms. Accordingly,
the Government's first suggested justification for applying § 2511(1)(c) to an other-
wise innocent disclosure of public information is plainly insufficient.
Id. at 531-32 (citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks omitted).
279 Id. at 532.
280 Id. at 533.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 534.
283 Id. at 535.
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cern, and respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that concern.
That debate ... is ... worthy of constitutional protection. '
284
Well, yes. But Kane and Bartnicki were not "engaged in debate about
that concern" during the unlawfully intercepted phone call. They were hav-
ing a private conversation about their frustrations and problems. 28 5
The Supreme Court attempted to limit its decision in several ways. First,
it left open the question whether, if a newspaper or other public medium
unlawfully acquired information of "public concern," the government could
punish disclosure as well as the unlawful acquisition. 286 It also held out the
possibility that the prohibition against disclosure might be upheld with regard
to matters not of "public concern" such as "trade secrets or domestic gos-
sip. '287 But a trade secret-which, after all, enables a company to charge
more for its product or services--can easily be made a matter of "public con-
cern" by politicians, agitators, and their allies in the media. And, given cur-
rent journalistic standards, query whether there is any distinction between
"public concern" and "gossip," at least as it relates to anyone who ever has
attracted media attention.28
8
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, filed a concurring opinion
"to explain why.., the Court's holding does not imply a significantly broader
constitutional immunity for the media. '289 The concurrence may be of con-
siderable significance, because, although Justices Breyer and O'Connor
signed Justice Stevens's majority opinion rather than concurring separately,
without their votes, Justice Stevens's opinion would not have attracted a ma-
jority of the Court.
Justice Breyer emphasized that, although 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) and the
corresponding provision of Pennsylvania's law "restrict public speech" and
"media publication" and do so "directly, deliberately, and of necessity.., not
simply as a means, say, to deter interception, but also as an end," they also
"directly enhance private speech" and, therefore, promote First Amendment
and privacy rights.29° Thus, "[a]s a general matter ... the Federal Constitu-
tion must tolerate laws of this kind because of the importance of these pri-
vacy and speech-related objectives. '291
Under the facts, however, as Justice Stevens wrote, the statutes in ques-
tion "disproportionately interfere with media freedom. '292 Justice Stevens
cited two reasons supporting this conclusion. First, the broadcasters had in
284 Id.
285 Id. at 518.
286 Id. at 528.
287 Id. at 533.
288 Suppose, for example, a scanner intercepted a participant in the teachers' salary dispute
having an angry cell phone conversation with his or her spouse and leaked it to a local newspa-
per. Is it too difficult to imagine the paper running an article entitled, say, "Pressures of Salary
Dispute Hit Home," including excerpts of the conversation to illustrate the "newsworthy" fact
that being caught in an angry public debate has its effects on participants' home life, too?
289 Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
290 Id. at 537.
291 Id. at 537-38.
292 Id.
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no way participated in or actively encouraged the unlawful interception. 293
Second, "the speakers had little or no legitimate interest in maintaining the
privacy of the particular conversation" because it "involved a suggestion
about 'blow[ing] off... front porches' and 'do[ing] some work on some of
those guys,' . . . thereby raising a significant concern for the safety of
others. "
29 4
Oh, please. The excerpt of the conversation reproduced in the opinion
strongly suggests that the only "blowing off" that did or would occur was
Bartnicki and Kane blowing off steam. This is confirmed by the fact that no
porches in the county had been damaged between the phone call and its dis-
closure 295-a disclosure which came, significantly, after the dispute had been
resolved mostly to the teachers' satisfaction.296 Clearly there was no longer
any need, assuming there ever was a need, for the local authorities to form a
special Porch Protection Unit.
29 7
If the four-month old fact that allies in a since-settled public controversy
used hyperbole while venting to each other in a private conversation is of
sufficient "public concern" to trump privacy legislation enacted by Congress,
it is difficult to discern how any information about those in public life would
escape such a classification. Consider the following hypothetical situations:
* Suppose a hacker broke into stored e-mails and discovered that
a candidate for public office had been treated for depression a
293 Id.
294 Id. at 539 (alterations in original). Justice Breyer cited several situations in which "the
law recognizes a privilege allowing the reporting of threats to public safety" where the act of
reporting would otherwise be actionable. Id. For example, there is a general privilege against
privacy actions to report "that another intends to kill or rob or commit some other serious crime
against a third person." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 cmt. G (1977)).
There is a privilege that is likely permitted in trade secret law to disclose information "relevant
to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substan-
tial public concern." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995). See
also Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 853 (10th Cir. 1972) (stating that a
nondisclosure agreement is not binding with respect to criminal activity); Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343-44 (Cal. 1976) (noting that the psychiatric privilege is not bind-
ing in the presence of danger to oneself or others).
295 I assume that the respondents would have introduced evidence of any otherwise unex-
plained epidemic of porch explosions in the intervening period.
296 Apparently, whoever recorded the conversation never presented the tape to the police,
as a civic-minded citizen might be expected to do if the conversation could reasonably be inter-
preted to indicate any serious intent to harm another physically.
297 That the supposed threat was uttered in May 1993, and the tape was not delivered to the
broadcasters until four months later, after the dispute had been settled, did not, in Justice
Breyer's view, alter the outcome. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring). "Even
where the danger may have passed by the time of publication, that fact cannot legitimize the
speaker's earlier privacy expectation. Nor should editors, who must make a publication decision
quickly, have to determine present or continued danger before publishing this kind of threat."
Id. The Court found this particularly true because petitioners were "limited public figures," who
"voluntarily engaged in a public controversy." Id. But if the "editors" (i.e., radio station person-
nel) were truly concerned about a "present or continuing danger," they would have notified the
police. Instead, they aired the tapes. The facts strongly suggest that the only danger the editors
feared was the risk of losing a juicy story (and the resultant publicity for the radio stations), with
perhaps the added "benefit" of reigniting the rancor in the community that only recently had
begun to subside.
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few years earlier. Or suppose the candidate's former employer,
reviewing the e-mails sent to or by the candidate on the com-
pany's system, made the same discovery. The snoop or the for-
mer employer leaks the information to the media. Is this
arguably of "public concern"? It is not very difficult to imagine
an argument that the public has a "right" to decide whether such
information is relevant in assessing the candidate's fitness for
office.
Suppose instead that the information discovered is that the can-
didate refills a prescription for Viagra each month. Presumably
all nine of the Justices would agree that this is not a matter of
"public concern." But once information was posted anony-
mously on the Internet, there would be no privacy in the infor-
mation left to preserve, which would free the media to report
about the information's availability on the Web.
298
Justice Breyer concluded his concurrence with the following:
[T]he Constitution permits legislatures to respond flexibly to the
challenges future technology may pose to the individual's interest in
basic personal privacy. Clandestine and pervasive invasions of pri-
vacy, unlike the simple theft of documents from a bedroom, are
genuine possibilities as a result of continuously advancing technolo-
gies. Eavesdropping on ordinary cellular phone conversations in
the street (which many callers seem to tolerate) is a very different
matter from eavesdropping on encrypted cellular phone conversa-
tions or those carried on in the bedroom. But the technologies that
allow the former may come to permit the latter. And statutes that
may seem less important in the former context may turn out to have
greater importance in the latter. Legislatures also may decide to
revisit statutes such as those before us, creating better tailored pro-
visions designed to encourage, for example, more effective privacy-
protecting technologies.
299
This passage is encouraging, until the reader seriously attempts to figure
out what it means. First, there is nothing in the record to suggest that either
participant in the Kane-Bartnicki phone conversation used his cell phone "in
the street" where passers-by could overhear. Second, nothing in Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion prior to this paragraph suggests that his position
would have changed if the cell phone had been encrypted. Finally, technolo-
gies already exist that enable a snoop to intrude into the mundane and the
most intimate activities, thoughts, and words of those targeted for the surveil-
lance. Legislation is not needed "to encourage ... more effective privacy-
298 See supra note 63 (where the "agony aunt" photograph lawsuit was dismissed because
the "aunt" no longer had an expectation of privacy in the posted photos).
299 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring). The Court, therefore, must "avoid
adopting overly broad or rigid constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict legislative
flexibility. I consequently agree with the Court's holding that the statutes as applied here violate
the Constitution, but I would not extend that holding beyond these present circumstances." Id.
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protecting technologies";300 the marketplace will provide encouragement
enough. But if the technological revolution of the past several decades
proves anything, it proves that technological innovation will protect privacy
for only a short period at best before snoops develop techniques to overcome
it.
What is needed is legal protection against both the seizure of private
information and its dissemination. The statutory provision at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1)(c) is well crafted, designed to deter unlawful interception of com-
munications not only by punishing those who intercept it, but by frustrating
those who might hope to use the media to disseminate the information. Ad-
ditional legislation similarly protecting stored communications and other
data would expand such protection. Instead, the Court, in Bartnicki v. Vop-
per, interprets existing legislation such that the damage a private snoop can
do to his target's privacy is greatly multiplied. A snoop can guarantee that
unlawfully obtained information will be disseminated to the public by anony-
mously passing such information on to media outlets. The media can lawfully
publish information obtained by unlawful interception of communications, by
unauthorized access to stored communications, and, presumably, by unlawful
hacking into private files and records, so long as it played no direct part in
the prior illegality, and the target's words, actions, or thoughts can be said to
have been "of public concern."'301
Conclusion
Privacy long has been a deeply held value. The law has played a part in
protecting privacy, but that part is necessarily limited. Until the past few
decades, privacy was protected from individual and commercial snooping pri-
marily by the limitations of technology available to acquire, store, or retrieve
information. Privacy was also protected by an informal social contract, often
breached but never formally disputed, that certain matters were nobody's
business or, at least, had no place in the mainstream organs of
communication.
Advances in surveillance technology and data storage and retrieval have
stripped away most of the practical safeguards to privacy, and the situation
will get only worse.3°2 At the same time, the "social contract" that often
limited the dissemination of private information has been effectively re-
voked. It is not at all clear that the law could make up for these losses. Un-
fortunately, gaps in federal legislation and a most unfortunate Supreme
Court decision may render the law impotent to protect privacy in a wide
range of circumstances.
Current debate has focused primarily on restricting and regulating the
government's ability to use the Internet to intrude upon individual privacy.
300 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
301 See id. at 535.
302 It is possible that techniques such as encryption will provide adequate protection to
some forms of communication and data storage. But the need to give legitimate recipients quick
and ready access to information will likely preclude encryption from becoming a broadly effec-
tive remedy.
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The far greater threat to privacy, however, comes from private individuals
and businesses. The Internet and related technologies have given anyone
with a mind to do so the ability to snoop on and betray others and to dissemi-
nate hurtful and embarrassing information. Add in the profits to be made
from identity theft, and the aggregate risk to privacy from individual betray-
ers, grudgers, and snoops far outstrips anything the government is likely to
do or even to try to do.
Similarly, commercial enterprises have the resources and the motive to
acquire detailed profiles about both the public and intimate aspects of our
lives-where and when we travel, where and what we eat, what we do for
entertainment, the personal hygiene products we buy. Employers may with
impunity review every e-mail an employee sends or receives and every Web-
browse an employee makes on company computers and Internet-access sys-
tems. Anyone who is brave, foolish, or unlucky enough to attract public at-
tention is likely to be targeted for such lawful or unlawful attention by
private snoops. 30 3 For those who become even "limited public figures,
30 4
the real possibility exists that the mass media, which has cast off its own stan-
dards of restraint and has been licensed by the Supreme Court to knowingly
publish the contents of unlawfully intercepted communications so long as
they relate to matters of "public concern," will make private information a
matter of local, regional, national, or even international common knowledge.
Symposia such as this one are valuable and important because a close
study of the situation, generally and in its particulars, is a crucial step toward
rectifying it. Still, I cannot escape the melancholy conviction that, in striving
to preserve our traditional concepts of privacy, we are desperately trying to
restore to health a beloved friend, who, despite our efforts, is dying.
303 Consider, for example, Monica Lewinsky, Linda Tripp, and Private Jessica Lynch. Pri-
vate Lynch was an innocent victim of circumstance. Ms. Lewinsky acted foolishly, then indis-
creetly (most of us did so one way or another when we were in our twenties, or thirties, or
forties, or... ). Ms. Tripp found herself caught up in a situation she did not seek and was unable
to control. None of these women sought public attention; yet each, in varying degrees, found
themselves targeted, examined, scrutinized, betrayed, and misrepresented by friends, strangers,
and large, impersonal institutions. The same has been and is likely to be true of any woman who
is sexually assaulted by a prominent man and reports it to the authorities. (Men as well as
women can be and have been the victims of unsought public attention, but, for whatever reason,
the public appetite for female victims is apparently far greater than that for male victims.)
304 See supra note 297.
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